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THE CURIOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “SELF-
DEPORTATION” POLICIES AND NATURALIZATION RATES 
by 
Angela M. Banks∗ 
Governor Mitt Romney has stated that the country’s immigration problems 
can be solved through “self-deportation.” Arizona, Alabama, Georgia, South 
Carolina, and Virginia agree. For example, K–12 public schools in 
Alabama are required to ascertain the immigration status of all enrolling 
students. Police officers in Arizona, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and 
Virginia check the immigration status of all individuals booked into jail. 
These “self-deportation” laws and policies, also known as immigration 
enforcement through attrition, are designed to discourage and deter 
unauthorized migration. Yet these policies are having a broader impact; they 
are creating a hostile context of reception for immigrants regardless of their 
immigration status. Social scientists have found that immigrants’ structural 
and cultural environment—their context of reception—plays an important 
role in shaping their incorporation patterns, including naturalization rates. 
Based on this social science research I offer a new argument about the impact 
of sub-federal immigration enforcement. Sub-federal immigration 
enforcement has overwhelmingly taken the form of “self-deportation” laws 
and policies. It is my contention that the growth of these policies may 
discourage eligible immigrants from naturalizing. The use of racial profiling 
to implement these policies shapes immigrants’ perceptions about the value of 
citizenship. It reveals that ethnicity, foreignness, and immigration status are 
often conflated, and that the social benefits of citizenship are not equally 
available to all. Recognition of this reality may cause some immigrants to 
conclude that the benefits of naturalization do not outweigh the costs. While 
“self-deportation” policies may successfully deter and discourage 
unauthorized migration, they may also discourage eligible Latino 
immigrants from naturalizing and becoming formal members of U.S. society. 
 
 
 
∗ Associate Professor, William & Mary School of Law; J.D. Harvard Law School, 
M.Litt. University of Oxford, B.A. Spelman College. For helpful conversations and 
comments I would like to thank Patricia A. Banks, Fatma E. Marouf, Margaret Taylor, 
Rose Cuison Villazor, the participants in the Hofstra Law & Citizenship Colloquium, 
Rutgers Faculty Workshop, Seattle University Faculty Workshop, Wake Forest Faculty 
Workshop, the Immigration Law Teachers Workshop, and the students in Racial and 
Ethnic Relations at Mount Holyoke College (Fall 2011). Anthony Balady, Christina 
Jacquet, Stephanie Latimer, and Rosemary Logan provided excellent research 
assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Governor Mitt Romney has stated that the country’s immigration 
problems can be solved through “self-deportation.”1 Arizona and states 
throughout the Southeast, like Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, 
agree.2 For example, K–12 public schools in Alabama are required to 
ascertain the immigration status of all enrolling students.3 Police officers 
 
1 Op-Ed., A Weakness for Romney, GOP, DENVER POST, June 25, 2012, at A17. 
2 See Beason–Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. 
Adv. Legis. Serv. 535 (LexisNexis) [hereinafter Beason–Hammon Act]; Support Our 
Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (Arizona S.B. 1070), ch. 113, 2010 
Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, amended by H.B. 2162, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070; Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, No. 252, 2011 Ga. Laws 794 
[hereinafter Ga. Immigration Law]; An Illegal Immigration Reform Bill, No. 69, 2011 
S.C. Acts 325 [hereinafter S.C. Immigration Law]. 
3 Beason–Hammon Act § 28(a)(1). 
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in Arizona, Alabama, Indiana, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia 
check the immigration status of all individuals booked into jail.4 
Additionally, in Arizona, Alabama, and South Carolina, if during a lawful 
stop, detention, or arrest a police officer has a reasonable suspicion that 
an individual is not lawfully present, the officer is required to ascertain 
the individual’s immigration status.5 These states also require employers 
to use E-Verify to ensure that individuals hired are authorized to work in 
the United States.6 
These “self-deportation” laws and policies, also known as 
immigration enforcement through attrition, are designed to discourage 
and deter unauthorized migration.7 Yet these policies are having a 
broader impact; they are creating a hostile context of reception for all 
immigrants, regardless of immigration status. Social scientists have found 
that immigrants’ structural and cultural environment—their context of 
reception—plays an important role in shaping immigrants’ incorporation 
patterns, including naturalization rates.8 
Based on this social science research I offer a new argument about 
the impact of sub-federal immigration enforcement. Immigration 
scholars have focused on the legal authority of states and localities to 
enact immigration-related laws,9 the use of racial profiling in local 
 
4 ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3906 (2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-1-2 (LexisNexis 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-62 
(2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-123 (Supp. 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-83.2 (2008). 
5 ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(a); Arizona S.B. 1070 § 2; S.C. Immigration Law § 6. The 
Supreme Court recently held that this provision of Arizona law is not preempted by 
federal law. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012). 
6 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214 (2012); Beason-Hammon Act § 15(b); S.C. 
Immigration Law § 9(B). 
7 RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A 
STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 6 (2011), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf; JESSICA M. VAUGHAN, 
CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, ATTRITION THROUGH ENFORCEMENT: A COST-EFFECTIVE 
STRATEGY TO SHRINK THE ILLEGAL POPULATION (Apr. 2006), available at 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2006/back406.pdf; Valerie Barney et al., Peach Sheet, 
Professions and Business, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 247, 250–51 (2006). 
8 Throughout this Article I use the terms environment and context 
interchangeably to refer to the structural and cultural setting that immigrants 
encounter. See, e.g., IRENE BLOEMRAAD, BECOMING A CITIZEN: INCORPORATING 
IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (2006); Irene 
Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen in the United States and Canada: Structured Mobilization 
and Immigrant Political Incorporation, 85 SOC. FORCES 667, 674 (2006) [hereinafter 
Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen]; Irene Bloemraad, Citizenship Lessons from the Past: The 
Contours of Immigrant Naturalization in the Early 20th Century, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 927, 928 
(2006) [hereinafter Bloemraad, Citizenship Lessons from the Past]; John R. Logan et al., 
The Political and Community Context of Immigrant Naturalisation in the United States, 38 J. 
ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 535 (2012); Jennifer Van Hook et al., For Love or Money? 
Welfare Reform and Immigrant Naturalization, 85 SOC. FORCES 643, 647 (2006). 
9 See, e.g., Nathan G. Cortez, The Local Dilemma: Preemption and the Role of Federal 
Standards in State and Local Immigration Laws, 61 SMU L. REV. 47 (2008); Karla Mari 
McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! “Illegal” Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration 
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immigration enforcement,10 and a breakdown of trust between law 
enforcement officials and immigrant communities.11 It is my contention 
that the growth of state and local “self-deportation” laws and policies may 
discourage eligible immigrants from naturalizing. Naturalization rates for 
Mexican immigrants have remained disproportionately low. In 2010 only 
10% of the 619,913 immigrants who naturalized were from Mexico.12 This 
is despite Mexican immigrants accounting for 32.2% of immigrants 
eligible to naturalize.13 
The use of racial profiling to implement “self-deportation” laws and 
policies shapes immigrants’ perceptions about the value of citizenship. It 
reveals that ethnicity, foreignness, and immigration status are often 
conflated, and that the social benefits of citizenship are not equally 
available to all. Recognition of this reality may cause some immigrants to 
conclude that the benefits of naturalization do not outweigh the costs.14 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I explains the growth of local 
immigration enforcement and its concentration in the Southeast. This 
region of the United States has experienced rapid demographic changes 
due to immigration, which has prompted state and local government 
officials to become more active in immigration enforcement. Part II 
 
Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 26–
27 (2007); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, 
Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27; Cristina M. 
Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 
(2008); Victor C. Romero, Devolution and Discrimination, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
377 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 57; Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. 
REV. 1627 (1997); Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. 
L. REV. 1619 (2008); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the 
Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001). 
10 See, e.g., David A. Selden et al., Placing S.B. 1070 and Racial Profiling into Context, 
and What S.B. 1070 Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 523 
(2011). 
11 A lack of trust can lead to decreased immigrant cooperation with law 
enforcement agents and therefore less police protection in immigrant communities. 
See Jennifer M. Chacón, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 129 (2010); Jacqueline Hagan et al., The Effects of U.S. Deportation Policies on 
Immigrant Families and Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1799 (2010); 
Bill Ong Hing, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration Reform, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 
307 (2009); Lisa R. Pruitt, Latina/os, Locality, and Law in the Rural South, 12 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 135 (2009); Virginia Martinez et al., A Community Under Siege: The Impact 
of Anti-Immigrant Hysteria on Latinos, 2 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 101 (2008); Yolanda 
Vázquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the 
Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 HOW. L.J. 639 (2011). 
12 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2010 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 55 tbl.21 (Aug. 2011). 
13 NANCY RYTINA, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2010, at 4 tbl.4 (2011). 
14 See, e.g., Van Hook et al., supra note 8, at 647 (noting that immigrants are more 
likely to “pursue social and legal integration if they perceive the host society’s system 
of status attainment as open and social mobility possible”). 
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argues that immigrants naturalize in order to take advantage of the social 
and material benefits of citizenship. Immigrants’ structural and cultural 
environment, their context of reception, provides information about 
whether the social and material benefits of citizenship will be available to 
them. Part III describes one aspect of immigrants’ context of reception—
state and local immigration enforcement policy. Part IV demonstrates 
that racial profiling and minor traffic violations are key aspects of state 
and local immigration enforcement strategies in the Southeast. Part V 
contends that these strategies create a hostile context of reception and 
reveal that citizenship may not provide all of the expected social benefits. 
“Self-deportation” policies may successfully deter and discourage 
unauthorized migration, but it may come at the cost of fewer Latino 
immigrants naturalizing and becoming formal members of U.S. society. 
I. IMMIGRATION IN THE SOUTHEAST 
Unauthorized migration has become a significant political issue in 
the Southeast as the demographics in this part of the country have 
changed. Unauthorized migrants are blamed for increased criminal 
activity, depleting limited government resources, and reducing 
employment opportunities for Americans and lawful migrants.15 The 
federal government’s failure to effectively limit or prevent unauthorized 
migration has led states to demand greater involvement in immigration 
enforcement. State laws encouraging unauthorized migrants to “self-
deport” have become a popular choice. Within the Southeast this has 
meant state laws requiring public health officials, K-12 school officials, 
and law enforcement officers to determine the immigration status of 
individuals being served and report unauthorized migrants to 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).16 Legislators state that 
these laws are intended to discourage, reduce, and ultimately eliminate 
unauthorized migration.17 
Between 1990 and 2010 the Southeast became a new destination for 
large-scale Latino immigration.18 This Part describes the demographic 
changes that the region experienced in this time period and the legal 
responses to these changes. 
 
15 See infra Part I.B. 
16 See, e.g., Beason–Hammon Act, 2011 Ala. Adv. Legis. Serv. 535 (LexisNexis); 
Ga. Immigration Law, 2011 Ga. Laws 794. 
17 See, e.g., Barney et al., supra note 7, at 251; VAUGHAN, supra note 7, at 13. 
18 HELEN B. MARROW, NEW DESTINATION DREAMING: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND 
LEGAL STATUS IN THE RURAL AMERICAN SOUTH (2011). 
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A. Demographics 
Of the ten states with the largest Latino growth between 1990 and 
2010, eight are located in the Southeast.19 The increases these states have 
experienced range from nearly 400% to over 900%.20 
 
TABLE 1. Increase in Latino Population 
1999–201021
STATE 1990–2010 % INCREASE 
North Carolina 942.8% 
Arkansas 836.1% 
Tennessee 785.9% 
Georgia 683.8% 
South Carolina 671.4% 
Alabama 653.6% 
Kentucky 504.2% 
Nevada 475.9% 
Mississippi 411.5% 
Minnesota 364.4% 
 
As a result, states like North Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia have seen 
Latinos go from being 2% or less of the state’s population to almost 9%.22 
 
TABLE 2. Latino Population by State 1990 and 201023
STATE 
LATINO POPULATION 
1990 
LATINO POPULATION 
2010 
North Carolina 1.2% 8.4% 
Arkansas 0.8% 6.4% 
Tennessee 0.7% 4.6% 
Georgia 1.7% 8.8% 
South Carolina 0.9% 5.1% 
Alabama 0.6% 3.9% 
Kentucky 0.6% 3.1% 
Mississippi 0.6% 2.7% 
Virginia 2.6% 7.9% 
Maryland 2.6% 8.2% 
 
 
19 See SHARON R. ENNIS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION: 
2010, at 6 tbl.2 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/ 
c2010br-04.pdf; BETTY GUZMÁN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION: 2000, 
at 4 tbl.2 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-3.pdf. 
20 See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 tbl.2; GUZMÁN, supra note 19, at 4 tbl.2. 
21 See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 tbl.2; GUZMÁN, supra note 19, at 4 tbl.2. 
22 See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 tbl.2; GUZMÁN, supra note 19, at 4 tbl.2. 
23 See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 tbl.2; GUZMÁN, supra note 19, at 4 tbl.2. 
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A significant portion of the Latino population in southeastern states is 
comprised of U.S. citizens, green-card holders who are formally referred 
to as lawful permanent residents (LPRs), and nonimmigrants.24 While 
southeastern states have a higher proportion of unauthorized migrants 
than traditional Latino immigrant destinations like California, Texas, and 
Florida, citizens and lawful migrants account for at least half of the 
Latino population in the Southeast.25 Even if one were to assume that all 
unauthorized migrants in the Southeast are Latinos, approximately half 
of the Latino residents would still be citizens or lawful migrants.26 For 
example, in 2010 unauthorized migrants accounted for 4.1% of North 
Carolina’s population and the Latino population was 8.4%.27 Similarly in 
Georgia unauthorized migrants accounted for 4.7% of the state’s 
population and Latinos accounted for 8.8%.28 Despite the variation of 
legal statuses represented within the Latino population, politicians often 
conflate Latinos and unauthorized migrants.29 Conflating these two 
populations undermines the incorporation of lawfully present Latino 
immigrants. 
The existence of an unauthorized migrant population in the 
Southeast has prompted calls for greater immigration enforcement by 
federal, state, and local officials. One of the concerns driving the need 
for greater immigration enforcement has been a perception that the 
unauthorized migrant population is causing an increase in violent crime. 
 
24 See MARROW, supra note 18, at 6 map 3; JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., 
GROWING SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS CHOOSING NATURALIZATION 29–30 (2007), available at 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/74.pdf. Lawful permanent residents are 
noncitizens who have been granted permission to reside in the United States 
indefinitely. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15) (2006). Nonimmigrants are noncitizens who have been granted 
permission to enter the United States for a specific purpose for a specified period of 
time. INA § 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1184. For example, a foreign student who is admitted 
pursuant to a student visa is a nonimmigrant. The student is admitted to attend 
school and is allowed to remain in the United States for a specified period of time. 
25 See MARROW, supra note 18, at 6–7 & map 3; see infra text accompanying notes 
26–28. 
26 This assumption would overestimate the number of Latino unauthorized 
migrants because recent Department of Homeland Security statistics indicate that 
unauthorized migrants hail from Mexico, Central America, China, India, the 
Philippines, Brazil, and Korea. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT 
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2010, at 4 tbl.3 (Feb. 2011), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf. 
The percentage of unauthorized migrants from Mexico, Central and South America 
is high, but it is not 100%. Id. (estimating this portion of the unauthorized 
population to be approximately 80%). 
27 See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 tbl.2; HOEFER, supra note 26, at 4 tbl.4. 
28 See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 tbl.2; HOEFER, supra note 26, at 4 tbl.4. 
29 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 8, Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. 
Magee, No. 2:11cv982-MHT (M.D. Ala. Nov. 18, 2011) (providing statements of 
Alabama legislators conflating Latino and unauthorized migrants). 
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B. Crime 
A perceived connection between immigrants and crime dates back to 
the nineteenth century.30 During that time period immigrants were 
blamed for increased criminal activity in cities like New York and 
Chicago.31 Today immigrants, particularly unauthorized migrants, are 
blamed for drug-related crimes and drunk driving accidents. Social 
science research, however, shows that increased immigration does not 
lead to increased crime. As early as 1911 the Dillingham Commission 
concluded: 
No satisfactory evidence has yet been produced to show that 
immigration has resulted in an increase in crime disproportionate 
to the increase in adult population. Such comparable statistics of 
crime and population as it has been possible to obtain indicate that 
immigrants are less prone to commit crime than are native 
Americans.32 
In 1994 the United States Commission on Immigration Reform 
reached similar conclusions.33 Additionally, crime rates declined in the 
1990s and early 2000s despite historic highs in authorized and 
unauthorized migration.34 Between 1994 and 2006 the foreign-born 
 
30 Historically within the United States public sentiment has linked increased 
immigration with higher crime rates. In the early twentieth century this perception 
led to the enactment of the first comprehensive crime-based deportation regime. 
Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and 
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling 
in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. 
United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1024 
(2010); Angela M. Banks, The Normative & Historical Cases for Proportional Deportation, 
62 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 17–21) (manuscript on file with 
author). In the 1980s this concern supported harsher immigration consequences for 
noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies. Banks, supra (manuscript at 43). With 
increased concerns about unauthorized migration and immigrant criminality in the 
1990s legislative reform expanded the aggravated felony definition and created 
harsher immigration consequences for noncitizens convicted of these crimes. Id. 
31 See, e.g., FREDERIC J. HASKIN, THE IMMIGRANT: AN ASSET AND A LIABILITY ch. 18 
(1913) (discussing the “oft-repeated statement that the aliens coming to America are 
distinguished for their criminal tendencies”); CYRUS PEIRCE, CRIME: ITS CAUSE AND 
CURE 29–32 (Boston, Crosby, Nichols, & Co. 1854) (decrying the trend of immigrants 
to remain in large cities and proposing inducements to convince them to move to the 
rural west). 
32 S. Doc. No. 61-747, at 163 (1910).  
33 U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING 
CREDIBILITY 4 (1994).  
34 RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., THE MYTH OF 
IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG 
NATIVE AND FOREIGN-BORN MEN 4 (2007), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/ 
sites/default/files/docs/Imm%20Criminality%20(IPC).pdf; see also M. Kathleen 
Dingeman & Rubén G. Rumbaut, The Immigration-Crime Nexus and Post-Deportation 
Experiences: En/Countering Stereotypes in Southern California and El Salvador, 31 U. LA 
VERNE L. REV. 363, 372 (2010). 
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population increased 71% from 22 million to 38 million.35 During this 
same time period there was a 34.2% decrease in the violent crime rate.36 
The homicide rate decreased 37.8%, the robbery rate dropped 40.8%, 
and the assault rate fell 31.9%.37 
Despite this evidence, immigrant populations continue to be blamed 
for criminal activity in southeastern communities. For example, the 
Davidson County Sheriff’s Office in Tennessee identified the arrest of six 
unauthorized migrants for homicide during the summer of 2006 as the 
impetus for its 287(g) program.38 The fact that several of these 
individuals had previously been arrested for misdemeanor crimes 
supported the community’s belief that 287(g) could be an effective tool 
for protecting public safety.39 The sheriff in Gwinnett County, Georgia 
was motivated to enter into a 287(g) agreement to combat the expansion 
of Mexican cartels within the county.40 Within the space of one week two 
sets of Mexican drug dealers were arrested in Gwinnett County on the 
same street.41 One arrest led to one of the largest methamphetamine 
busts in history and the other led to a gun battle that ended with one 
person dead.42 Gwinnett County Sheriff Butch Conway stated that an 
effective way to fight the cartels was to deport any “illegal” that commits a 
crime, even a traffic offense.43 He stated that an individual could be a 
major in a cartel and if he is pulled over for no license he is going to be 
deported.44 Sheriff Neil Warren in Cobb County, Georgia also saw a 
connection between the increase in unauthorized migration and 
methamphetamine activity in the metro Atlanta area.45 In Manassas 
County, Virginia residents founded Help Save Manassas to deal with 
concerns about unauthorized migration. Help Save Manassas was worried 
about unauthorized migrants involved in gang-related murders, rapes, 
 
35 Dingeman & Rumbaut, supra note 34, at 373. 
36 RUMBAUT & EWING, supra note 34, at 4.  
37 Id. 
38 DAVIDSON CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, 287(G) TWO-YEAR REVIEW 4 (2009), available 
at http://blackburn.house.gov/UploadedFiles/287g_Two_Year_Review.pdf. The 287(g) 
program allows state and local law enforcement officials to enforce federal 
immigration law. See infra Part III.A for a more detailed discussion of the 287(g) 
program. 
39 See Daron Hall, Op-Ed., The 287(g) Program Is Working, and Residents Are Safer 
Because of It, TENNESSEAN, Aug. 12, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 26372843. 
40 Dustin Inman Society, 287(g); Gwinnett County GA—ENFORCEMENT WORKS!, 
YOUTUBE (May 20, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EvkKTekM8Yo&noredirect=1 
(CBS Atlanta local news report). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Al Meyer, Neil Warren at the Cobb County GOP Breakfast, COBB COUNTY 
REPUBLICAN (Apr. 28, 2005), http://theconservativesentinel.blogspot.com/2005_04_ 
01_archive.html. 
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and child sexual assaults. To address these concerns Help Save Manassas 
lobbied for a 287(g) agreement.46 
In addition to concerns about serious or violent crimes, drinking and 
driving cases involving unauthorized migrants became another 
justification for increased local immigration enforcement. Between 2003 
and 2008 over one-third of the drunk driving charges in Johnston 
County, North Carolina have been levied against Latinos.47 Stories such as 
that of Luciano Tellez captivate communities and serve as rallying cries 
for local immigration enforcement.48 Mr. Tellez was an unauthorized 
migrant when he ran a stop sign, ran into another car, and caused an 
explosion. Mr. Tellez killed a man and a nine-year old boy and sped away 
from the scene of the accident. When his car was stopped it was littered 
with beer cans.49 In another incident seven-year old Marcus Lassiter was 
killed when a stolen car driven by Hipolito Camora Hernandez hit him.50 
Hernandez was charged with second-degree murder, speeding, and 
driving while intoxicated.51 Hernandez had been arrested previously for 
driving while intoxicated, but he was never convicted.52 The article 
reporting this story does not mention Hernandez’s immigration status, 
but Sheriff Bizzell is quoted saying, “If [Hernandez] hadn’t been here to 
start with, that wouldn’t have happened. A 7-year old that’s playing in his 
front yard pays the ultimate price for another drunk Mexican.”53 
Johnston County, North Carolina is not the only jurisdiction to 
experience drunk driving fatalities at the hands of unauthorized 
migrants. An unauthorized migrant who was driving while intoxicated 
killed Scott Gardner, a Gaston County, North Carolina high school 
teacher.54 Mr. Gardner’s wife was also in the vehicle and was left in critical 
 
46 Statement on New 287(g) Agreement, HELP SAVE MANASSAS, http://www.helpsave 
manassas.org/index.php/press-releases/new-287g-agreement. 
47 Kristin Collins, Tolerance Wears Thin, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 7, 
2008, at A1. 
48 Johnston County does not have a 287(g) agreement, but Sheriff Steve Bizzell 
brokered a deal with Wake County whereby some unauthorized migrants arrested in 
Johnston County are taken to Wake County where a 287(g) jail enforcement 
agreement exists. Sarah Ovaska, Deportation Fear Fuels Fight, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh, N.C.), June 12, 2008, at A1. 
49 Collins, supra note 47. 
50 Ovaska, supra note 48. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Press Release, Richard Burr, U.S. Senator of N.C., Burr, Dole Re-Introduce the 
Scott Gardner Act (Mar. 13, 2007), http://burr.senate.gov/public/index.cfm? 
FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=a36192c1-9e65-4863-9546-
d1ce0de1bb6b; Karen Shugart, Driving While Hispanic, CREATIVE LOAFING CHARLOTTE 
(Dec. 21, 2005), http://clclt.com/charlotte/Content?oid=2360315; Illegal Immigrant 
Indicted for 2nd Degree Murder, WECT (Aug. 1, 2005), http://www.wect.com/Global/ 
story.asp?S=3668666&nav=2gQccpas. 
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condition.55 The driver had several previous DUI convictions.56 In 
Georgia, two car accidents in Cobb County involving unlicensed 
unauthorized migrants caused the death of a Cobb County deputy and 
the father of six children.57 The Sheriff’s Department of Alamance 
County in North Carolina contends that DUIs are the number one killer 
of Latino males.58 These accidents are used to highlight the importance 
of local immigration enforcement, specifically 287(g) agreements.59 
Within the past twenty years, southeastern states have experienced a 
significant increase in the Latino population. This growth is the result of 
both births and immigration.60 Part of that growth is due to unauthorized 
migration, and residents within the Southeast blame unauthorized 
migrants for drug-related criminal activity and drunk driving. 
Unauthorized migrants’ perceived disproportionate involvement in 
criminal activity has fueled support for state and local law enforcement 
officials to be involved in immigration enforcement. 
As southeastern states have struggled to address the local challenges 
related to unauthorized migration, less attention has been paid to 
incorporating lawfully present Latinos (citizens, green-card 
holders/LPRs, and nonimmigrants) into the local communities in which 
they reside and work. Immigrant incorporation is achieved when 
immigrants are integrated into U.S. society such that it is difficult to 
differentiate their legal protections, access to public resources, 
educational outcomes, language skills, and job opportunities from those 
of native-born citizens.61 Certain strategies and policies for addressing 
 
55 Illegal Immigrant Indicted for 2nd Degree Murder, supra note 54. 
56 Id.; Press Release, Richard Burr, supra note 54. 
57 Brian Feagans, Bills Aim to Tighten Clamps on Illegals, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 
11, 2007, at D1. 
58 Karen Welsh, Illegal Immigrants Filling Jails, CAROLINA J. ONLINE (July 27, 2006), 
http://www.carolinajournal.com/articles/display_story.html?id=3465. 
59 These concerns also motivated the 287(g) agreement in Nashville, Tennessee. 
Amada Armenta, From Sheriff’s Deputies to Immigration Officers: Screening Immigrant Status 
in a Tennessee Jail, 34 LAW & POL’Y. 191, 196 (2012). Drunk driving and other forms of 
impaired driving are serious threats to public safety. Community outrage about drunk 
driving has been particularly vociferous when the drivers are immigrants, particularly 
unauthorized migrants. Drunk driving accidents involving citizens have not raised the 
same types of concerns within communities. When accidents have involved 
unauthorized migrants, the public has called for the broken immigration system to be 
reformed. Public officials contend that “only a lockdown on our borders could 
remedy this situation.” Shugart, supra note 54. When accidents involve Latino 
immigrant victims and United States citizen drunk drivers, no similar outrage is 
visible. Id. Drunk driving is serious no matter who is behind the wheel, but there is 
little justification for treating the crime differently when committed by unauthorized 
migrants rather than citizens. 
60 See Stephen Ceasar, U.S. Hispanic Population Tops 50 Million, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 
25, 2011, (Nation) at 15. 
61 See RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM: 
ASSIMILATION AND CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION 5–6, 11–12 (2003); ALEJANDRO PORTES 
& RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 13, 232–41 (3d ed. 2006) 
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unauthorized migration can undermine the immigrant incorporation 
process for lawfully present migrants. Part II uses social science theory on 
immigrant incorporation to explain how immigration enforcement 
strategies can undermine immigrant incorporation by discouraging 
green-card holders from naturalizing. 
II. IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION 
A. Naturalization 
E pluribus unum, a melting pot, a tossed salad, a mosaic. These are all 
terms that are used to describe the various ways in which immigrants are 
incorporated into U.S. society.62 The United States prides itself in being a 
country of immigrants that is simultaneously a cohesive nation-state. 
Whether or not immigrants are incorporated into U.S. society is an issue 
of importance to the government and social scientists. Federal agencies 
and courts have identified it as an important goal, and social scientists 
have investigated the processes by which incorporation occurs. 
From 1795 to 1952, U.S. law treated immigration as a process by 
which foreign-born residents became citizens.63 During this time period 
the naturalization process required applicants to submit a declaration of 
intent several years before actually naturalizing.64 Once this declaration 
was submitted, the “intending citizen” had rights, benefits, and access to 
resources that were unavailable to immigrants who had not filed the 
 
[hereinafter PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA]; ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. 
RUMBAUT, LEGACIES: THE STORY OF THE IMMIGRANT SECOND GENERATION 46–48 (2001) 
[hereinafter PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES]. 
62 Throughout this paper I use the terms incorporated and assimilated 
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the cultural and structural inclusion of 
immigrants in American society. Cultural incorporation, also referred to as 
acculturation, is the process by which immigrants adopt the language, culture, ideals, 
values, and behaviors of the receiving society. PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra 
note 61, at 46. Structural incorporation focuses on immigrants’ place within a 
society’s socioeconomic hierarchy. Alejandro Portes & Alejandro Rivas, The  
Adaptation of Migrant Children, 21 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 219 (2011), available at 
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/21_01_10.pdf; see 
also MILTON M. GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE ROLE OF RACE, 
RELIGION, AND NATIONAL ORIGINS (1964); Min Zhou, Segmented Assimilation: Issues, 
Controversies, and Recent Research on the New Second Generation, 31 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 
975, 977 (1997). This is typically measured by examining educational attainment, 
residential concentration, intermarriage rates, and employment. PORTES & RUMBAUT, 
LEGACIES, supra note 61, at 46–50. 
63 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION 
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2006). 
64 Id.; see also Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137; Naturalization Act of 
1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254; Naturalization Law of 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153, amended by 
Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 54, 16 Stat. 254; Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, 1 
Stat. 556 (repealed 1802); U.S. Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414, repealed 
by Naturalization Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 556; U.S. Naturalization Law of 1790, ch.3, 1 
Stat. 103, repealed by U.S. Naturalization Act of 1795, 1 Stat. 414. 
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declaration.65 For example, intending citizens were eligible for land 
grants pursuant to the Homestead Act of 1862, occasionally granted 
diplomatic protection by the United States when abroad, and could vote 
until the early twentieth century.66 Hiroshi Motomura contends that 
during this time period immigrants were seen as Americans in waiting.67 
There was a presumption that eligible immigrants would naturalize.68 
Immigration was viewed as a process that ended with naturalization. The 
extension of rights, benefits, and access to resources allowed immigrants 
to reap the material benefits of citizenship before that status was officially 
granted. U.S. law no longer extends these material benefits to intending 
citizens and the declaration of intention was made optional in 1952.69 
The process of becoming a citizen is no longer a gradual process, but 
immigrant incorporation remains a goal of U.S. immigration law. 
Naturalization is one way in which this goal is operationalized.70 
In 1997 the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform highlighted 
the importance of immigrant incorporation. The Commission referred to 
this process as Americanization.71 Americanization was defined as “the 
process of integration by which immigrants become part of our 
communities,” it is the “civic incorporation of immigrants, that is the 
cultivation of a shared commitment to the American values of liberty, 
democracy, and equal opportunity.”72 Naturalization plays an important 
part in this process. The Commission noted that “[n]aturalization is the 
most important act a legal immigrant undertakes in the process of 
becoming an American.”73 President Bush’s Task Force on New 
Americans reiterated the importance of immigrant incorporation and 
naturalization in 2006. This task force was charged with strengthening 
 
65 MOTOMURA, supra note 63, at 8–9. 
66 Id. at 9. 
67 Id. 
68 This presumption only extended to those immigrants who were eligible for 
naturalization. Between 1790 and 1952 there were racial restrictions on 
naturalization. IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
42–43 (1996). There was no presumption that racially ineligible immigrants would 
become citizens. 
69 MOTOMURA, supra note 63, at 9, 116. 
70 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 
CONST. COMMENT. 9, 16 (1990) (“Although federal law does not require that resident 
aliens apply for naturalization, citizenship is clearly the intended end of the 
immigration process. Given the predominant American view that most foreigners 
would acquire U.S. citizenship if they could, resident aliens who choose not to 
naturalize are subject to criticism or suspicion.” (footnote omitted)). 
71 U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION 
AND IMMIGRANT POLICY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY v–vii (1997); see also Final Report of the 
Commission on Immigration Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 9–11 (1997) (statement of Hon. Shirley 
M. Hufstedler, Chair, U.S. Comm’n on Immigration Reform). 
72 U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 71, at vi. 
73 Id. at xii. 
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federal, state, and local agency efforts “to help legal immigrants embrace 
the common core of American civic culture, learn our common 
language, and fully become Americans.”74 
Immigration law and policy, historically and today, have viewed 
naturalization as an important goal of the immigration process. 
Naturalization symbolizes the complete incorporation of immigrants in 
American society. Failed incorporation threatens the realization of e 
pluribus unum.75 The Supreme Court recognized the problems that arise 
when immigrants are not successfully incorporated into U.S. society. In 
Plyler v. Doe the Court stated that the existence of “a substantial ‘shadow 
population’” of unauthorized migrants 
raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident 
aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap 
labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes 
available to citizens and lawful residents. The existence of such an 
underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides 
itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.76 
If immigrants are failing to naturalize because they believe that they will 
not be able to fully reap the social benefits of citizenship, a fundamental 
immigration policy goal has been thwarted. 
Immigrant incorporation has also been a perennial area of study for 
immigration scholars. Scholars initially studied the assimilation of 
Southern and Eastern European immigrants during the late 19th and 
early 20th century.77 These immigrants were deemed “undesirable, 
unassimilable, and hostile or indifferent to American values.”78 Once 
Southern and Eastern European immigrants successfully assimilated, 
scholars began to examine how that process occurred and whether it was 
unique to that historical moment and the characteristics of those 
immigrants.79 These questions became relevant again when examining 
the trajectory of post-1965 immigrants who are overwhelmingly from 
 
74 TASK FORCE ON NEW AMERICANS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUILDING AN 
AMERICANIZATION MOVEMENT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY iv (2008). 
75 This is the national motto, which means “from many, one.” U.S. COMM’N ON 
IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 71, at v n.2. The Commission on Immigration 
Reform noted that this motto “has also come to mean the vital unity of our national 
community founded on individual freedom and the diversity that flows from it.” Id. 
76 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218–19 (1982). 
77 GORDON, supra note 62; ROBERT EZRA PARK, RACE AND CULTURE (1950); ROBERT 
E. PARK ET AL., THE CITY (1925); W. LLOYD WARNER & LEO SROLE, THE SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS (1945). 
78 LEONARD DINNERSTEIN & DAVID M. REIMERS, ETHNIC AMERICANS: A HISTORY OF 
IMMIGRATION 96 (5th ed. 2009). 
79 See, e.g., TOMÁS R. JIMÉNEZ, REPLINISHED ETHNICITY: MEXICAN AMERICANS, 
IMMIGRATION, AND IDENTITY 140–41 (2010); MARROW, supra note 18; DOUGLAS S. 
MASSEY & MAGALY SÁNCHEZ R., BROKERED BOUNDARIES: CREATING IMMIGRANT IDENTITY 
IN ANTI-IMMIGRANT TIMES (2010); PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 
61, at 91–93; PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra note 61, at 44–49; MARY C. WATERS, 
BLACK IDENTITIES: WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANT DREAMS AND AMERICAN REALITIES (1999). 
LCB_16_4_Art_2_Banks.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/9/2013  9:02 PM 
2012] “SELF-DEPORTATION” POLICIES & NATURALIZATION 1163 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Would the differences in race, ethnicity, 
and labor market conditions make it harder for post-1965 immigrants to 
successfully assimilate? Recent theories on the incorporation of post-1965 
immigrants focus on context of reception as an important factor. This 
section utilizes the context of reception model to examine the impact 
that local immigration enforcement strategies can have on naturalization 
rates. 
B. Why Do Immigrants Naturalize? 
Not everyone can naturalize. Naturalization is available to 
noncitizens who are at least eighteen years old, have a green card, have 
resided in the United States continuously for five years, are persons of 
good moral character, are “attached to the principles of the Constitution 
of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness 
of the United States,” are able to read, write, and speak English, and are 
knowledgeable about U.S. history and government.80 
Naturalization is the only means by which immigrants become full 
members of the American polity. Citizens have the most extensive bundle 
of rights within the United States. The rights to vote and remain in the 
United States are considered two of the most important rights.81 Many 
scholars contend that access to the material benefits of citizenship shape 
naturalization decisions.82 Yet naturalization also provides immigrants 
with social benefits, such a sense of acceptance and membership within 
the host society and social mobility.83 The social environment that 
immigrants experience conveys valuable information about whether 
immigrants are welcome, whether the host society values immigrant 
contributions, and whether acceptance and mobility will be possible.84 
Immigrants are more likely to “pursue social and legal integration if they 
perceive the host society’s system of status attainment as open and social 
 
80 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §§ 316, 334(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427, 
1445(b) (2006); 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–.5 (2012). The residence requirement is only three 
years if the individual is the spouse of a U.S. citizen. INA § 319, 8 U.S.C. § 1430. 
81 See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 163–75 (1998). 
82 See, e.g., DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE 
DECLINE OF CITIZENSHIP 39–40, 65 (1996); GUILLERMINA JASSO & MARK R. ROSENZWEIG, 
THE NEW CHOSEN PEOPLE: IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 99–101 (1990); SCHUCK, 
supra note 81, at 164–75. 
83 John A. Garcia, Political Integration of Mexican Immigrants: Explorations into the 
Naturalization Process, 15 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 608, 617 (1981); Kerstin Gerst & 
Jeffrey A. Burr, Welfare Use Among Older Hispanic Immigrants: The Effect of State and 
Federal Policy, 30 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 129, 132 (2011). Naturalization can 
also generate new social networks and increase access to old social networks, which 
can assist with upward mobility. Irene Bloemraad, The North American Naturalization 
Gap: An Institutional Approach to Citizenship Acquisition in the United States and Canada, 
36 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 193, 214 (2002); Logan et al., supra note 8, at 549; Van Hook 
et al., supra note 8, at 644, 647. 
84 Logan et al., supra note 8, at 549; Van Hook et al., supra note 8, at 647. 
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mobility possible.”85 Immigrants use their environment to ascertain 
whether or not the United States is a place where they can do well. 
The decision to naturalize has been conceptualized in two distinct 
ways. First, naturalization is seen as the culmination of the assimilation or 
incorporation process.86 Naturalization marks integration into the “social, 
cultural and political life of the receiving society.”87 This perception of 
naturalization is supported by research that explains who naturalizes by 
focusing on individual and community characteristics. Those most likely 
to naturalize are those who own homes, speak English, have lived in the 
United States longer, have more education, or live in immigrant 
communities with high naturalization rates.88 These characteristics reflect 
acceptance and adherence to middle-class American values.89 Second, 
naturalization is viewed as an instrumental or defensive decision. Within 
this conception of naturalization, immigrants naturalize in order to 
maintain or obtain access to material benefits uniquely available to 
citizens.90 This has been referred to as defensive, instrumental, or 
 
85 Van Hook et al., supra note 8, at 647. 
86 See, e.g., Greta Gilbertson & Audrey Singer, The Emergence of Protective Citizenship 
in the USA: Naturalization Among Dominican Immigrants in the Post-1996 Welfare Reform 
Era, 26 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 25, 26 (2003) (discussing this perspective); Robert C. 
Smith, Transnational Localities: Community, Technology and the Politics of Membership 
Within the Context of Mexico and U.S. Migration, in TRANSNATIONALISM FROM BELOW 196–
97 (Michael Peter Smith & Luis Eduardo Guarnizo eds. 1998). 
87 Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 26. 
88 See, e.g., JASSO & ROSENZWEIG, supra note 82, at 101, 117–21; Guillermina Jasso 
& Mark R. Rosenzweig, Family Reunification and the Immigration Multiplier: U.S. 
Immigration Law, Origin-Country Conditions, and the Reproduction of Immigrants, 23 
DEMOGRAPHY 291, 301–04 (1986); Zai Liang, Social Contact, Social Capital, and the 
Naturalization Process: Evidence from Six Immigrant Groups, 23 SOC. SCI. RES. 407, 431 
(1994); Alejandro Portes & John W. Curtis, Changing Flags: Naturalization and its 
Determinants Among Mexican Immigrants, 21 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 352, 365–70 (1987); 
Philip Q. Yang, Explaining Immigrant Naturalization, 28 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 449, 464, 
474 (1994). 
89 These characteristics are seen to matter because individuals with them 
understand the benefits of naturalizing more quickly than individuals without these 
characteristics. PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61, at 144, 146. 
Research has consistently shown that there is less disparity in naturalization rates the 
longer individuals have resided in the United States. Id. at 146 (noting that “the 
passage of time leads inexorably to higher levels of naturalization”). Research has also 
noted that those with fewer individual resources and skills may find the naturalization 
process more difficult. Id. at 146. This mirrors another category of explanations for 
naturalization rates and that is regulatory and bureaucratic barriers. Mexican 
immigrants are predicted to have lower naturalization rates because they typically do 
not have the skills and resources that are associated with high naturalization rates. Id. 
at 144–46. 
90 See, e.g., Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 30; Audrey Singer & Greta 
Gilbertson, Naturalization in the Wake of Anti-Immigrant Legislation: Dominicans in New 
York City 3 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Working Paper No. 10, 2000), 
available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dominican.pdf. 
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protective naturalization.91 Here, the decision to naturalize has nothing 
to do with identity or a sense of membership within the polity. 
1. The Material and Social Benefits of Citizenship 
These two perspectives on naturalization reflect the different 
categories of benefits that citizenship offers. For those immigrants who 
view naturalization as an indication of complete incorporation into U.S. 
society the availability of the social benefits of citizenship will play an 
important role in the decision making process. For those who view 
naturalization as a means to a specific material end, the availability of the 
material benefits of citizenship will likely be decisive. In reality, 
individuals likely view naturalization as both a marker of incorporation 
and a means to material benefits. 
The social science naturalization literature focused on the material 
benefits of citizenship in the wake of the 1996 immigration and welfare 
reforms. Scholars have debated whether linking more benefits to 
citizenship would cause eligible green-card holders to naturalize.92 What 
has been examined less is the impact of differential access to the social 
benefits of citizenship. This section discusses the social and material 
benefits of citizenship and argues that both categories of benefits factor 
into immigrants’ decisions to naturalize. 
A growing body of social science research contends that immigrants 
naturalize for defensive reasons—to retain or gain access to material 
benefits that are exclusively available to U.S. citizens.93 This conception of 
the decision to naturalize has little to do with conceptions of identity or 
belonging. Here naturalization is viewed as a means to a material end. 
The empirical evidence demonstrating defensive or instrumental 
naturalization is mixed. A number of scholars have found that 
naturalization rates increased after the enactment of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA), which eliminated green-card holders’ eligibility for federal 
 
91 Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 29–30, 44–45. 
92 See infra Part II(B)(2) for further discussion of these research findings. 
93 See, e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE IMPACT OF 
WELFARE REFORM ON IMMIGRANT WELFARE USE 9 (2002) [hereinafter BORJAS, THE 
IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM], available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/borjas.pdf; 
Kelly Stamper Balistreri & Jennifer Van Hook, The More Things Change the More They 
Stay the Same: Mexican Naturalization Before and After Welfare Reform, 38 INT’L MIGRATION 
REV. 113 (2004); George J. Borjas, Welfare Reform and Immigrant Participation in Welfare 
Programs, 36 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 1093, 1094 (2002) [hereinafter Borjas, Welfare 
Reform and Immigrant Participation]; Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 30; Michael 
Jones-Correa, Institutional and Contextual Factors in Immigrant Naturalization and Voting, 5 
CITIZENSHIP STUD. 41, 41 (2001); Paul M. Ong, Defensive Naturalization and Anti-
Immigrant Sentiment: Chinese Immigrants in Three Primate Metropolises, 21 ASIAN AM. POL’Y 
REV. 39 (2011), available at http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic855678.files/ 
AAPR_2_15_11_FINAL%20_3_.pdf. 
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welfare benefits.94 Yet other scholars have found that access to welfare 
benefits does not increase the probability of naturalizing.95 Access to 
welfare benefits however, is not the only material benefit of 
naturalization, and Congress restored green-card holders access to 
certain welfare benefits in 1997.96 Other material benefits include voting 
rights, access to certain jobs, and exemption from U.S. immigration law.97 
Immigrants likely view each of these material benefits differently and 
consequently weigh them differently when deciding whether or not to 
naturalize. For example, Balistreri and Van Hook found some support 
for the proposition that immigrants naturalized “in response to policies 
that restrict the ability to sponsor their relatives for legal migration to the 
United States.”98 Similarly Gilbertson and Singer’s qualitative study of 
Dominican immigrants in New York found that immigrants naturalized 
in order to facilitate transnational residence (unrestricted travel to and 
from the United States) and to be eligible for a broader range of jobs.99 
The prospect of voting rights has also been considered a factor 
influencing naturalization decisions.100 One response to a negative or 
hostile environment is to seek greater political engagement in order to 
facilitate change. Scholars and community organizations have noted that 
hostile contexts of reception can motivate some immigrants to 
naturalize.101 The Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles 
contends that Proposition 187 motivated immigrants to naturalize so that 
they could vote its supporters out of office.102 During the March 2006 
 
94 Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 402, 431(b), 110 Stat. 2105, 2262–65, 2274 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612, 1641(b)). For evidence that naturalization rates 
increased, see, for example, BORJAS, THE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM, supra note 93, at 
9; George J. Borjas, Welfare Reform and Immigration, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 
369, 379–81 (Rebecca M. Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001); Borjas, Welfare Reform and 
Immigrant Participation, supra note 93, at 1094; Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 
43 (“The decline in concern about acquiring U.S. citizenship, in large part because 
many of the benefits that were ‘taken away’ from legal permanent residents have 
been restored.”). 
95 See, e.g., Balistreri & Van Hook, supra note 93, at 125–28; Van Hook et al., supra 
note 8, at 655. 
96 Michael Fix & Wendy Zimmermann, All Under One Roof: Mixed-Status Families in 
an Era of Reform, 35 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 397, 415 & n.12 (2001). Access is generally 
conditioned on five years of residence in the United States. See President Announces 
Welfare Reform Agenda, Promising Foods Stamps for Legal Immigrants, 79 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 404, 404 (2002). 
97 See Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 30, 40; SCHUCK, supra note 81, at 166. 
98 Balistreri & Van Hook, supra note 93, at 128. 
99 Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 37–40. 
100 Jones-Correa, supra note 93, at 44–45. 
101 See, e.g., Michael Jones-Correa, Under Two Flags: Dual Nationality in Latin 
America and Its Consequences for Naturalization in the United States, 35 INT’L MIGRATION 
REV. 997, 1017 (2001). 
102 Building Voting Power in California for Immigration Reform, COALITION FOR 
HUMANE IMMIGRANT RTS. L.A., http://www.chirla.org/node/36. Proposition 187 made 
unauthorized migrants ineligible for government services like public education, 
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demonstrations, participants carried signs reading “Hoy Marchamos, 
Mañana Votamos (“Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote”).103 A variety 
of organizations undertook naturalization and voter registration drives 
after the marches.104 
Some immigrants naturalize in order to obtain the material benefits 
that are exclusively available to U.S. citizens. Yet other immigrants appear 
to be motivated by the social benefits that citizenship offers. Less 
research has been done examining this motivation for naturalization, but 
scholars have found that citizenship offers a sense of membership in the 
polity, presumed belonging, social standing, and a tool for social 
mobility.105 Research on immigrants’ context of reception has found that 
immigrants are more likely to naturalize when they have a welcoming 
environment.106 This type of environment signals that the social benefits 
of citizenship are available. Van Hook, Brown, and Bean compared the 
probability of different immigrants naturalizing to identify the impact of 
two factors: access to welfare benefits and environment.107 The 
researchers found that the probability of naturalization was the same for 
welfare recipients and non-recipients, but that individuals in locations 
with more positive environments were more likely to naturalize.108 Logan, 
Oh, and Darrah found a similar relationship between positive 
environments and naturalization decisions.109 A welcoming public 
attitude increased the odds of naturalizing. This effect was present for 
white, black, Asian, and Latino immigrants, but it increased the odds of 
naturalization most for Latino and Asian immigrants.110 
 
healthcare, and welfare benefits. This law also required government officials to report 
suspected unauthorized migrants to immigration authorities. Proposition 187, 1994 
Cal. Stat. A-317, invalidated by League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 
F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
103 Ruth Milkman, Labor and the New Immigrants Rights Movement: Lessons from 
California, BORDER BATTLES (Jul. 28, 2006), http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Milkman/ 
printable.html. 
104 Id. 
105 See Bloemraad, supra note 83, at 213–14; Garcia, supra note 83, at 617; Gerst & 
Burr, supra note 83, at 132; Logan et al., supra note 8, at 549; Van Hook et al., supra 
note 8, at 647. 
106 Van Hook et al., supra note 8, at 644. 
107 State-level attitudes towards immigrants and immigration were used to measure 
context of reception. The researchers used a scale developed by previous researchers 
based on responses on the General Social Survey from 1995 to 1997. Id. at 653. 
108 Id. at 660. 
109 Logan et al., supra note 8, at 549. The researchers used the existence of a 
safety net for immigrants and public attitudes about immigrants to measure context 
of reception. The same surveys were used to measure public attitudes as were used by 
Van Hook et al. Id. at 544. 
110 Id. at 549 (effect was only a 1.4% increase in the odds of naturalizing for 
whites and, but 3% for Latinos, Asians, and blacks). Logan, Oh, and Darrah also 
found support for instrumental reasons for naturalizing. Immigrants in states with 
fewer restrictions on access to social services were less likely to naturalize. Id. 
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Recent work utilizing the context of reception model provides new 
opportunities to investigate the role that social benefits play in the 
naturalization decision-making process. The following section explains 
what constitutes an immigrant’s context of reception and the role that it 
plays in immigrant incorporation. 
2. Context of Reception 
A context of reception approach to naturalization focuses on the 
role that the structural and cultural aspects of an immigrant’s 
environment play in naturalization decisions “above and beyond the role 
played by . . . individual characteristics or motivations.”111 A growing 
number of scholars are taking this approach to studying naturalization 
and broader issues of immigrant incorporation.112 In the area of 
naturalization Irene Bloemraad has found that tangible government 
support to recent immigrants positively shapes immigrants’ context of 
reception and increases the likelihood of naturalization.113 Bloemraad’s 
research seeks to explain why Portuguese immigrants in Canada have 
significantly higher naturalization rates than Portuguese immigrants in 
the United States despite having similar characteristics. Bloemraad’s 
research indicates that the different levels of institutional support in 
Canada and the United States explain the gap. In Canada the 
government “encourage[s] citizenship through symbolic support and 
instrumental aid to ethnic organizations and community leaders.”114 In 
the United States, the government plays virtually no role in encouraging 
noncitizens to naturalize. When the government plays an active role in 
providing information to noncitizens about the benefits of naturalizing 
and encourages them to do so, it results in higher naturalization rates. 
Bloemraad concludes that “[i]f naturalization is lower in the United 
States than in Canada, it might be less due to the type of immigrants 
America attracts than to the welcome they are given.”115 
Bloemraad’s thesis has been extended to show that not only do 
government efforts that motivate immigrants to naturalize matter, so do 
other aspects of immigrants’ context.116 Sociologists have found that the 
 
111 MARROW, supra note 18, at 9; PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra 
note 61, at 91–102. 
112 See, e.g., MARROW, supra note 18; Logan et al., supra note 8; Van Hook et al., 
supra note 8. 
113 Bloemraad, supra note 83, at 213–22; see also BLOEMRAAD, supra note 8; 
Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen, supra note 8; Bloemraad, Citizenship Lessons from the 
Past, supra note 8. 
114 Bloemraad, supra note 83, at 193, 213–22. 
115 Id. at 224. 
116 See Balistreri & Van Hook, supra note 93; Logan et al., supra note 8; Van Hook 
et al., supra note 8, at 643, 647; see also Garcia, supra note 83 (earlier examination of 
the role of social identity in decisions to naturalize). This research expands the 
conversation about social contextual factors that influence naturalization decisions. 
For example, previous scholars have found that social capital, residential segregation, 
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more welcoming an immigrants’ context is the more likely immigrants 
are to naturalize.117 
Context plays a similar role in the broader incorporation process. 
Social scientists have demonstrated that immigrant incorporation is 
context specific.118 Four distinct dimensions of immigrants’ context or 
environment that have been studied are government policy, labor market 
conditions, existing ethnic or national communities, and reactions from 
the native population.119 These dimensions shape the “framework of 
economic opportunities and legal options available to migrants once they 
arrive.”120 It also affects the “moral resources made available by the 
government, employers, and the community.”121 Each of these 
dimensions either facilitate or hinder an immigrant’s incorporation 
within American society because they channel “immigrants in different 
directions, often altering the link between individual skills and expected 
rewards.”122 For example, welcoming immigration laws and “a viable 
economy with abundant jobs”123 facilitate immigrants’ social and 
economic incorporation. Alternatively, harsh laws regulating 
immigration and the lives of immigrants or a bad economy make it 
difficult for immigrants to exploit the skills and motivation they have 
brought with them. Absent an opportunity to use their existing skills, 
immigrants risk having lower levels of educational and economic 
achievement, political participation, and sense of belonging within the 
United States.124 
Each dimension of an immigrant’s context or environment operates 
at a national, regional, state, local, and interpersonal level.125 For 
example, the focus of this Article, immigration enforcement, operates at 
 
and employment-based interactions with citizens help explain which immigrants 
naturalize. See, e.g., Liang, supra note 88, at 431. 
117 Logan et al., supra note 8, at 549; Van Hook et al., supra note 8, at 644; see 
supra text accompanying notes 106–10. 
118 See PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61; see also MARROW, 
supra note 18, at 233; MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ R., supra note 79, at 36–40. 
119 See MARROW, supra note 18, at 233; PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, 
supra note 61, at 92–93. 
120 PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61, at 93. 
121 Cecilia Menjívar, Immigrant Kinship Networks and the Impact of the Receiving 
Context: Salvadorans in San Francisco in the Early 1990s, 44 SOC. PROBS. 104, 106 (1997) 
(citing PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61, at 93). 
122 Cecilia Menjívar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives 
in the United States, 111 AM. J. SOC. 999, 1002 (2006); see also PORTES & RUMBAUT, 
IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61, at 101. 
123 Menjívar, supra note 122, at 1002.  
124 See PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra note 61. 
125 MARROW, supra note 18, at 233–34; Michael Jones-Correa & Katherine 
Fennelly, Immigration Enforcement and Its Effects on Latino Lives in Two Rural North 
Carolina Communities, QUANTITATIVE INITIATIVE FOR POL’Y & SOC. RES., 32 (2011), 
http://qipsr.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/Correa-Enforcement%20Effects%20in% 
20NC%2011.02.pdf. 
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a national, state, local, and interpersonal level. The federal government 
establishes immigration law and policy and federal officers enforce those 
laws and policies. State and local governments are increasingly enacting 
laws and adopting policies that regulate the lives of immigrants and at 
times implicate the enforcement of federal immigration law. The 
programs addressed in Part III, such as 287(g) and state laws requiring 
immigration status checks in jails, are examples of government policy 
operating at the state and local level. Finally, immigration enforcement 
operates at an interpersonal level. Immigrants interact with individual 
police officers, sheriffs, and ICE agents. These individual interactions 
contribute to the context that immigrants experience.126 
The national, regional, state, local, and interpersonal levels of an 
immigrant’s context can vary, and they can contradict or complement 
one another. For example, federal immigration policy could create a 
neutral environment or context while state and local policy creates a 
hostile environment that is reinforced by interpersonal experiences with 
local law enforcement officers. Alternatively federal immigration policy 
could create a hostile environment while state and local law and policy 
create a positive environment that is reinforced by individual experiences 
with law enforcement agents.127 Much of the recent research utilizing the 
context of reception model has focused on national context. This Article 
adds to the growing scholarship that focuses on the ways in which local 
institutions contribute to immigrants’ context.128 
The use of minor traffic violations to ascertain immigration status in 
southeastern states is an example of national, state, and local law and 
policy reinforcing one another to create a hostile environment for 
immigrants.129 State and local law enforcement officials implement this 
specific strategy, but the federal government concurs with this approach 
when ICE officials issue a detainer and institute removal proceedings 
against individuals whose only criminal offense is a minor traffic offense. 
As the Migration Policy Institute found in its research on 287(g) 
programs, there is substantial agreement about policy priorities between 
ICE and local law enforcement officials.130 The use of minor traffic 
 
126 See Armenta, supra note 59, at 204 (describing examples of local police officers 
enforcing federal immigration law and exercising discretion in ways that allowed 
unauthorized migrants to regularize their status). 
127 MARROW, supra note 18, at 234–35. Marrow refers to this as vertical 
differentiation. In her study of Latino immigrants in rural North Carolina she found 
that vertical differentiation complicated “any singular notion of what context meant 
for [immigrants’] experiences in the rural South on the ground.” Id. at 235. 
Sometimes the various components of the context of reception worked in concert 
and at other times they were “competing cross-pressures.” Id.  
128 See, e.g., MARROW, supra note 18; MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ R., supra note 79; PORTES & 
RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra note 61; Jones-Correa & Fennelly, supra note 125. 
129 See infra Part III.C. 
130 CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 26. 
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offenses to identify unauthorized migrants is an example of national, 
state, and local policy working in concert in southeastern states. 
This Article focuses on one dimension of the context that 
immigrants encounter in the United States: government policy in the 
form of immigration enforcement.131 Sociologists have found government 
policy to be critically important in the lives of immigrants; it determines 
access to the United States, legal status, and access to economic and 
social resources.132 Portes and Rumbaut have described government 
policies as “the first stage of the process of incorporation because it 
affects the probability of successful immigration and the framework of 
economic opportunities and legal options available to migrants once they 
arrive.”133 Law, policy, and legal institutions determine immigrants’ legal 
status, which has become a critical factor for how freely immigrants are 
able to move throughout U.S. society and how they are perceived and 
treated by the native population.134 
The research examining reasons for naturalizing demonstrates that 
both social and material benefits matter. What is less clear is how much 
each category of benefits matter and how much specific benefits within 
each category matter. Are material benefits always more important than 
social benefits? Are certain social benefits more important than certain 
material benefits? Additional research is needed to answer these 
questions and to get a better sense of the institutional and personal 
factors that shape the strength or weakness of specific material and social 
benefits. For example, do English language skills, length of time in the 
 
131 Just as context can vary by levels of government, it can also vary by 
institutional space. For example, the context of reception created by law enforcement 
officials may differ from that created by K–12 schools or medical services agencies. 
MARROW, supra note 18, at 234–36.  
132 Governments can respond in three different ways to immigrants: exclusion, 
passive acceptance, and active encouragement. PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra 
note 61, at 46. When exclusion is the basis for immigration policy individuals are 
unable to gain lawful admission to the United States. Any entry to the United States is 
clandestine, which leads to an underground existence once in the United States. 
Passive acceptance would describe United States policy towards most family-based and 
employment-based immigration. Here the government grants individuals legal access, 
but makes no additional effort to facilitate immigrants’ incorporation into society. Id. 
at 46–47. Unlike countries like Canada, the United States government does not 
provide resettlement resources for immigrants. This type of assistance is reserved for 
refugees who are granted asylum in the United States. This would be an example of 
active encouragement, where the government is active in facilitating immigrants’ 
resettlement. Id. at 47. Active encouragement also occurs when the government plays 
an active role in encouraging particular immigrant streams. An example would be the 
Bracero Program that took place between 1942 and 1964. See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE 
THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. 1–3 (2010). 
133 PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61, at 93. 
134 Based on field work with Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants, Cecilia 
Menjívar concluded that focusing on the legal aspect of immigrants’ context of 
reception was appropriate because legal status “emerged as paramount in the 
immigrants’ lives.” Menjívar, supra note 122, at 1003. 
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United States, educational attainment, or socioeconomic status make the 
social benefits of naturalization more or less important? While we don’t 
have the answers to these questions yet, what we do know is that both 
categories of benefits matter. 
The context that immigrants encounter provides information about 
the availability of both categories of benefits. The remainder of this 
Article focuses on how local immigration enforcement policy shapes 
immigrants’ knowledge about the social benefits of citizenship and their 
expectations about the availability of such benefits. 
III. SUB-FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
Since 1996, an increasing number of mechanisms have become 
available for state and local law enforcement officials to participate in 
immigration enforcement. The primary mechanisms have been 287(g) 
jail enforcement agreements, Secure Communities, and state laws 
requiring jail officials to ascertain and report immigration status. It is my 
contention that these mechanisms encourage the arrest of presumed 
unauthorized migrants so that an immigration status check can occur. 
The authority to stop and arrest an individual for minor traffic offenses 
gives state and local law enforcement officials a significant amount of 
power to indirectly ascertain immigration status.135 This power has been 
exercised disproportionately in Latino communities. Enforcement 
strategies that rely on ethnic appearance can cause Latino immigrants to 
doubt that naturalization, absent a change in ethnic appearance, will 
facilitate social mobility and acceptance as full members of American 
society.136 
By the 1990s the federal government’s failure to control 
unauthorized migration had become an issue of national concern. 
California enacted Proposition 187 in 1994, which prevented 
unauthorized migrants from receiving government services like public 
education, health care, and welfare benefits.137 Furthermore, Proposition 
 
135 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
IN CONTEXT: HOW DISCRETION IS EXERCISED THROUGHOUT OUR IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 4–
5 (2012), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/ 
motomura_-_discretion_in_context_04112.pdf; see also Hiroshi Motomura, The 
Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the 
Civil–Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1842–49 (2011) [hereinafter Motomura, 
The Discretion That Matters]. 
136 See infra Parts IV and V for further discussion of the relationship between the 
use of ethnicity in immigration enforcement and perceptions about the available 
benefits of naturalization. 
137 Proposition 187 §§ 5–8, 1994 Cal. Stat. A-317, A-318 to A-320. Proposition 187 
was permanently enjoined in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 997 
F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The state of California initially appealed the decision, 
but later withdrew its appeal and decided to have the case decided in mediation. The 
mediation upheld the district court’s decision and Proposition 187 was never 
enforced. CA’s Anti-Immigrant Proposition 187 Is Voided, Ending State’s Five-Year Battle 
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187 required government officials to report unauthorized migrants (and 
those presumed to be) to federal immigration authorities.138 While other 
states did not follow suit until the 2000s, Proposition 187 was an early call 
for better federal enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws. One 
aspect of this call was a plea to allow state and local government officials 
to assist the federal government in enforcing immigration law.139 This 
plea has been heeded with the enactment of federal and state law. In 
1996 Congress enacted significant immigration reform through the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA).140 IIRIRA included section 287(g), which allows the 
Department of Homeland Security to deputize state and local officials to 
enforce federal immigration law.141 States took action by enacting laws 
requiring jail officials to ascertain the immigration status of all 
individuals booked and to report noncitizens to Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE).142 
Today state and local law enforcement officials participate in 
immigration enforcement in two significant ways. First, they are 
authorized by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to perform 
the functions of an immigration officer. This is done through a 287(g) 
agreement between DHS and the state or locality. Second, local law 
enforcement officials exchange information with DHS for all individuals 
 
with ACLU, Rights Groups, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (JUL. 29 1999), 
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/cas-anti-immigrant-proposition-187-voided-
ending-states-five-year-battle-aclu-righ. 
138 §§ 4, 9, 1994 Cal. Stat. at A-317 to A-318, A-320. 
139 Specific authorization for state and local participation in immigration 
enforcement was necessary because immigration enforcement has been deemed a 
federal power. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the 
Supreme Court held that the immigration power is a federal power. 130 U.S. 581 
(1889); 149 U.S. 698 (1893). The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly delegate the 
immigration power. The only mention of immigration-related authority is Congress’ 
power to create a uniform naturalization law. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. To 
determine which level of government, and which branch of government, was 
authorized to exercise immigration authority, the Court examined the nature of the 
immigration power. The Court concluded that this power was intimately connected 
to foreign affairs, which is exclusively delegated to the federal government. Therefore 
immigration authority lies exclusively with the federal political branches of 
government. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604–09; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711–12. 
These holdings have provided the basis for decisions holding that state laws 
regulating immigration are preempted by federal law. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of 
Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170, 204–06 (3rd Cir. 2008), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. United States reaffirms that the federal 
government has exclusive authority to regulate immigration. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
140 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
141 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). 
142 Arizona, Alabama, Indiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and 
Virginia have all enacted such laws. See infra text accompanying notes 182–91. Certain 
criminal acts make an individual deportable regardless of their immigration status. See 
INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006). Reporting all noncitizen criminals to 
ICE allows ICE to determine which, if any, of the noncitizens are deportable. 
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arrested who were born outside of the United States. This second 
approach is effectuated through state laws and Secure Communities. 
A. 287(g) 
287(g) is one of several programs within ICE Agreements of 
Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security (ICE 
ACCESS). These programs facilitate cooperation between ICE and state, 
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies.143 Additional programs 
include Secure Communities and the Criminal Alien Program, which will 
be addressed below. Section 287(g) of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to 
enter into agreements with states and localities to have local law 
enforcement officials enforce federal immigration law.144 This was a new 
innovation introduced in IIRAIRA in 1996. 
It was 2002 before the first agreement was entered into and few 
additional agreements were entered into until 2007.145 That year 27 
agreements were concluded, 30 agreements were entered into in 2008, 
and an additional 10 in 2009 and 2010.146 Over half of these agreements 
were entered into with southeastern states or localities.147 As noted in Part 
I.A, this region experienced significant growth in the Latino population 
between 1990 and 2010. The Southeast became a new destination for 
large-scale Latino migration and in the first part of the twenty-first 
century this region responded by seeking greater opportunities for local 
immigration enforcement. 287(g) provides one option for such 
enforcement. 
There are two types of 287(g) agreements: jail enforcement 
agreements and task force agreements. Jail enforcement agreements 
authorize local law enforcement agents to ascertain an inmate’s 
immigration status, “communicate with ICE about immigrants in their 
 
143 ICE ACCESS, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/access/. 
144 INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). 
145 See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 9, 54–55. There were eight total 287(g) 
agreements before 2007. Those agreements were with Florida, Alabama, Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Department (California), Arizona, San Bernardino County Sheriff’s 
Department (California), Orange County Sheriff’s Department (California), 
Riverside County Sheriff’s Department (California), and Mecklenburg County 
Sheriff’s Department (North Carolina). See id. at 54–55; FOIA Library, ICE 
http://www.ice.gov/foia/library/ (collecting current and old agreements). 
146 See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 9, 54–55; Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration 
Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/news/ 
library/factsheets/287g.htm#signed-moa (showing in-force agreements); FOIA Library, 
supra note 145. 
147 287(g) has grown quickly in the Southeast. The states with the most 287(g) 
agreements are Virginia with nine, Arizona and North Carolina with eight, and 
Arkansas and Georgia with five. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 
287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, supra note 146; FOIA Library, supra note 145. 
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custody, issue ICE detainers, and transfer inmates to ICE custody.”148 All 
of this takes place within the confines of a local jail. The first official 
inquiries about immigration status under a 287(g) jail enforcement 
program take place once an individual has been booked into the local 
jail.149 As part of the typical booking process an inmate is asked her place 
of birth and nationality. When there is a 287(g) jail enforcement 
agreement in place any inmate who officers believe is foreign-born, based 
on inmate admission or other information, is screened.150 The screening 
process entails checking DHS databases for information on immigration 
status and interviewing the inmate to ascertain immigration status.151 
Once an inmate’s immigration status has been determined the officer 
enters the information into ENFORCE, ICE’s database and case 
management system. If the officer determines the inmate is removable 
she can issue an ICE detainer, which allows the jail to hold the inmate for 
up to 48 hours until he or she can be transferred to ICE for removal 
processing.152 The officer can also issue a Notice to Appear (NTA), which 
is the official charging document that initiates removal proceedings.153 
Pursuant to the 287(g) agreement, local law enforcement agents in jails 
have access to DHS databases, can issue ICE detainers, and issue NTAs.154 
Absent a 287(g) agreement the local law enforcement agents would not 
be able to engage in these activities. 
Task force agreements authorize local law enforcement agents to 
enforce federal immigration law outside of jails.155 For example, an 
officer could enforce immigration law on a highway, in a shopping mall, 
or at a workplace. These officers could approach any individual to 
inquire about immigration status as long as they have reasonable 
suspicion that an immigration law has been violated. Pursuant to a task 
force agreement local law enforcement agents are authorized to inquire 
about immigration status, access DHS databases, and issue ICE detainers 
and NTAs just like officers with a jail enforcement agreement. Local 
officers with a task force agreement have the additional authority to 
“issue arrest warrants for immigration violations and execute search 
warrants.”156 The majority of the 287(g) agreements currently in force are 
 
148 CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 14. 
149 Id.; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. Legal Found. & Immigration & 
Human Rights Pol’y Clinic, The Policies and Politics of Local Immigration Enforcement 
Laws, ACLU N.C., 23 (Feb. 2009), http://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/files/ 
287gpolicyreview_0.pdf. 
150 CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 14. 
151 Id. at 13. Questions used to ascertain immigration status include Where were 
you born?, When and where did you first enter the United States?, and Did you enter 
with or without authorization? Id. 
152 Id. at 13, 16 fig.1. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 13. 
155 Id. at 15. 
156 Id. 
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jail enforcement or hybrid agreements.157 Pursuant to a hybrid agreement 
both jail enforcement and task force activities take place within one 
jurisdiction.158 
287(g) jail enforcement agreements facilitate the use of minor 
criminal offenses as a tool for reducing the unauthorized migrant 
population. While patrol officers are not deputized to enforce 
immigration law, the deputized officers at the jail can check the 
immigration status of any individual the patrol officer arrests and books 
into jail. Patrol officers can use offenses like having a broken tail light, 
improper stop, or failing to dim headlights as a pretext for determining 
immigration status. This is the allegation that has been made in 
numerous southeastern states where 287(g) agreements are operating.159 
B. Secure Communities 
Similar concerns exist about Secure Communities.160 Unlike 287(g) 
agreements, Secure Communities does not involve deputizing local law 
enforcement agents to enforce immigration law. This program uses 
biometric information collected by local law enforcement agents to 
identify noncitizens with criminal convictions. All individuals booked into 
jail have their fingerprints taken. Traditionally those fingerprints are 
 
157 Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act, supra note 146. 
158 CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 15. Fewer jurisdictions have local law 
enforcement agents deputized to enforce federal immigration law outside of jails. 
159 See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUND. OF GA., THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL 
PROFILING IN GWINNETT: TIME FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND AN END TO 
287(G), at 5, 10–11 (2010), available at http://www.acluga.org/download_file/ 
view_inline/1504/260/ [hereinafter ACLU GWINNETT]; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUND. OF GA., TERROR & ISOLATION IN COBB: HOW UNCHECKED POLICE POWER UNDER 
287(G) HAS TORN FAMILIES APART AND THREATENED PUBLIC SAFETY 9–16 (2009), 
available at http://www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline/1505/260/ [hereinafter 
ACLU COBB]; A. ELENA LACAYO, NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 21, THE 
IMPACT OF SECTION 287(G) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT ON THE LATINO 
COMMUNITY (2010), available at http://www.nclr.org/images/uploads/publications/ 
287gReportFinal.pdf; SARAH WHITE & SALMUN KAZEROUNIAN, TENN. IMMIGRANT & 
REFUGEE RIGHTS COAL., THE FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTION: RACIAL PROFILING AND 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN BEDFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE 6 (2011), available at 
http://www.tnimmigrant.org/storage/The%20Forgotten%20Constitution.pdf. 
160 One aspect of the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) raises similar concerns as 
well. CAP works to identify, process, and remove noncitizens convicted of crimes who 
are incarcerated in federal, state, and local jails and prisons. The program was 
created so that ICE could obtain custody of these individuals before they are released 
to the general public. The jail and prisons component of CAP assigns ICE agents to 
certain federal, state, and local jails and prisons. The ICE agents perform the same 
functions as local law enforcement officials acting pursuant to a 287(g) jail 
enforcement agreement. Criminal Alien Program, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/criminal-
alien-program/. Thus for jails and prisons that have ICE agents assigned to them, 
local law enforcement agents are aware that arresting an individual that will be 
booked at one of these facilities will commence an immigration investigation. 
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shared with the FBI, and the FBI runs them through the Integrated 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), a fingerprint and 
criminal history database. Pursuant to the Secure Communities program 
the same fingerprints are also sent to the Department of Homeland 
Security. DHS runs the fingerprints through the Automated Biometric 
Identification System (IDENT). IDENT is a database containing 
biometric-based immigration records. This includes records for 
individuals who have applied for a visa, been granted a visa, been 
admitted to the United States, or been removed from the United States. 
IDENT identifies any individual with an immigration record.161 While 
IDENT identifies individuals with immigration records, it does not 
identify individuals who entered the United States without inspection 
and have evaded contact with immigration authorities. 
If there is a hit on IDENT an Immigration Alien Query is sent to the 
ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC). LESC sends its report to 
the local ICE Enforcement and Removal Office and that office 
determines whether or not to issue a detainer. A detainer authorizes a jail 
to hold the individual for an additional 48 hours so that ICE can retrieve 
them to begin removal proceedings.162 
A predecessor to Secure Communities is the Criminal Alien Program 
(CAP). In this program local jail officials hold noncitizens until an ICE 
official can screen the individual and ascertain their immigration 
status.163 After ICE conducts its review it determines whether or not to 
issue a detainer.164 Unlike the 287(g) program, local law enforcement 
officers acting pursuant to Secure Communities and CAP are not 
deputized ICE agents—they do not have access to DHS databases to 
ascertain immigration status, and they do not have the authority to issue 
an ICE detainer or an NTA.165 Federal immigration officials conduct 
these activities. Local enforcement officials only make federal officials 
aware of specific noncitizens. 
The vast majority of individuals removed pursuant to Secure 
Communities have been individuals convicted of Level one, two, or three 
 
161 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT  
SECURE COMMUNITIES STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesops93009.pdf; 
Secure Communities, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/. 
162 See 8 U.S.C. § 287(d); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 161, at 4. In 
responding to an Immigration Alien Query LESC provides information on the 
individual’s immigration status. Id. 
163 TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, 
ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN THE ICE CRIMINAL 
ALIEN PROGRAM 1 (2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_ 
irving_FINAL.pdf. 
164 Id. 
165 See id. at 2. 
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offenses—75%.166 Yet less than half of those removed, 45%, were 
individuals convicted of Level one or two offenses.167 Level one offenses 
include drug trafficking, national security crimes, murder, manslaughter, 
rape, robbery, kidnapping, and other violent crimes.168 Level two offenses 
are minor drug and property offenses.169 Examples include burglary, 
larceny, fraud, and money laundering.170 Level three is all other 
offenses.171 
These numbers support the main critique that has been raised about 
Secure Communities—it is not being used to identify and deport the 
most serious noncitizen criminals. ICE states that it “prioritizes the 
removal of criminal aliens, those who pose a threat to public safety, and 
repeat immigration violators.”172 Immigrant advocates, think tanks, 
academics, and government officials have questioned ICE’s adherence to 
this policy. As of August 2011 Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York have 
tried to pull out of Secure Communities.173 They contend that DHS 
misrepresented the program to them by stating that it would be used to 
identify and deport serious criminals when in fact it has been used to 
identify and deport unauthorized migrants who are crime victims, 
witnesses, and those with minor criminal convictions.174 
The data support the conclusion that the majority of the individuals 
deported as a result of Secure Communities are convicted criminals. But 
they are not the serious threats to public safety and national security that 
is the stated goal of the program. Less than half of those deported have 
been convicted of Level one or two offenses.175 Twenty-five percent were 
deported based on immigration violations such being a fugitive, 
 
166 IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability Monthly Statistics Through August 31, 2012, ICE, 2 
(2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_interop_stats-fy2012-to-
date.pdf. Between its inception in October 2008 and August 2012, only 11,390 
individuals who entered without inspection or violated the terms of their visa have 
been identified and removed as a result of Secure Communities. This represents 
roughly 5% of those removed pursuant to the program. See id. 
167 Id. Only 28% were convicted of Level one offenses. Id. 
168 Template for Memorandum of Agreement, ICE, 2 (July 31, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesmoatemplate.pdf. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 3. 
172 Secure Communities, supra note 161. 
173 Chip Mitchell, States May Have to Readopt Deportation Program, NPR (Aug.  
18, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/18/139725801/states-may-have-to-re-adopt-
deportation-program. 
174 Id.; Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama’s Immigration Strategy, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2011, at A18; Press Release, N.Y. Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, 
Governor Cuomo Suspends Participation in Federal Secure Communities Program 
(June 1, 2001), available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/06012011Federal 
SecureCommunitiesProgram. 
175 IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability Monthly Statistics Through August 31, 2012, supra 
note 166, at 2. 
LCB_16_4_Art_2_Banks.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/9/2013  9:02 PM 
2012] “SELF-DEPORTATION” POLICIES & NATURALIZATION 1179 
overstaying a visa, or entering without inspection.176 Secure Communities 
has been an effective tool in increasing the number of noncitizens 
deported. Yet a number of states, particularly in the Southeast, want 
more enforcement and have enacted their own laws to facilitate greater 
immigration enforcement. 
C. State Laws 
State laws to address immigration enforcement have focused on 
requiring jailers to ascertain the immigration status of foreign-born 
individuals booked into jail.177 Arizona, Alabama, Indiana, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Virginia have all enacted such laws.178 
Tennessee requires that jailers verify the citizenship status of all 
individuals arrested, booked, or confined for any period of time in a 
county or municipal jail or detention facility. Officers are also required to 
report individuals who may be in violation of federal immigration law to 
the appropriate ICE field office.179 Alabama’s June 2011 immigration law 
requires that any noncitizen “who is arrested and booked into custody 
shall have his or her immigration status determined” and verified by 
contacting the federal government.180 Additionally when a state, county, 
or municipal law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion that an 
individual encountered during a lawful stop, detention, or arrest is 
unlawfully present in the United States, the officer is required to make a 
reasonable attempt to determine the individual’s citizenship and 
immigration status.181 North Carolina law requires any county or local jail 
to verify the immigration status of individuals detained on a felony or 
impaired driving charge.182 Virginia requires the same of any individual 
booked into any jail.183 In Prince William County, Virginia General Order 
45 required Prince William County police officers to inquire about the 
 
176 Id. 
177 Additional states have also required other government officials to ascertain 
and/or report immigration status. For example, Alabama requires school officials 
and healthcare professionals to ascertain immigration status. ALA. CODE § 31-13-7 
(LexisNexis 2011); id. § 31-13-27, invalidated by Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. 
Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d 1236, 1244–49 (“In short, we do not find these 
justifications . . . substantial enough to justify the significant interference with the 
children’s right to education under Plyler[ v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)]. We therefore 
conclude that [§ 31-13-27] violates the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
178 ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(b) (LexisNexis 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3906 
(2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-1-2 (LexisNexis 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-62 
(2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 530.1 (West Supp. 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-
123 (Supp. 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-83.2 (2008). 
179 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-123. 
180 ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(b). 
181 Id. § 31-13-12(a). Alabama’s law mirrors that of Arizona’s SB 1070 enacted in 
spring 2010. See Arizona S.B. 1070, § 2, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 451, amended by H.B. 
2162, § 3, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070, 1073. 
182 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-62. 
183 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-83.2. 
LCB_16_4_Art_2_Banks.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/9/2013  9:02 PM 
1180 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:4 
citizenship or immigration status of persons lawfully detained for a 
violation of state or local law.184 Officers did not have to arrest an 
individual in order to ascertain their immigration status; lawful detention 
was sufficient. This order was modified in July 2008 such that inquiring 
into immigration status is no longer mandatory.185 
Pursuant to these state and local laws, local law enforcement officers 
are not deputized as federal immigration officials; they simply request 
information regarding immigration status from the Department of 
Homeland Security.186 These laws are an effort to facilitate cooperation 
between federal, state, and local law enforcement officials.187 
Regardless of the authority upon which local law enforcement 
officers are seeking immigration status information, the information is 
being gathered upon arrest and booking. Thus, whether a state or 
locality has a 287(g) agreement, participates in Secure Communities, or 
has state law requiring jail officials to ascertain immigration status, local 
law enforcement officials are playing an important role in immigration 
enforcement. Local law enforcement officials have a great deal of power 
in deciding whose immigration status will be checked because of the 
power and discretion they have to arrest. Officers know that an arrest, 
any arrest, will begin a process in which immigration status information 
will be gathered. For those who are interested in reducing the 
unauthorized migrant population within their jurisdiction arrests for 
minor traffic offenses are an easy way to check the immigration status of 
large portions of the population. The disproportionate use of this 
enforcement strategy in Latino communities has caused Latino 
immigrants to feel targeted based on their ethnicity.188 These experiences 
can cause Latino immigrants to conclude that naturalization may not 
provide the social mobility and acceptance as a full member of society 
 
184 THOMAS M. GUTERBOCK ET AL., EVALUATION STUDY OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
POLICE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICY: INTERIM REPORT 2009, at 18 
(2009), available at http://www.pwcgov.org/government/dept/police/Documents/ 
10636.pdf. 
185 Id. at 18–19. 
186 Local law enforcement officers seeking immigration status information submit 
a request to the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center located in Vermont. Law 
Enforcement Support Center, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/lesc/. 
187 Arizona’s law providing for such cooperation was the subject of the Supreme 
Court’s 2012 decision in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). The federal 
government argued that Arizona was preempted from enacting a law requiring local 
law enforcement officials to ascertain the immigration status of individuals lawfully 
stopped, detained, or arrested. Id. at 2507–08. The legal challenge was filed before 
the law went into force and lower courts had enjoined the law. Id. at 2498. The 
Supreme Court concluded that it was too early to determine whether federal law 
preempted Arizona’s law. Id. In theory it was possible that the law could operate 
without conflicting with or obstructing the federal law. The Court noted that there 
may be additional constitutional problems with the state provision after it comes into 
force, but the Court was not willing to make predictions. Id. at 2507–10.  
188 See infra Part IV.C.2. 
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that it provides for other naturalized citizens. As long as they appear 
Latino, law enforcement officials, and others, will perceive them as 
foreign and unauthorized.189 
IV. ENFORCEMENT THROUGH TRAFFIC STOPS 
Within the Southeast, traffic offenses have become the predominant 
means of identifying deportable noncitizens pursuant to 287(g) 
agreements. In this Part, I contend that traffic stops for minor traffic 
violations are being used as a pretext to ascertain immigration status. 
This immigration enforcement strategy is used disproportionately in 
Latino communities and creates a hostile environment, which can shape 
Latino immigrants’ expectations regarding naturalization and social 
mobility. 
Thirty percent of all ICE detainers issued nationwide in 2010 
pursuant to 287(g) agreements were based on traffic offenses.190 Half of 
these cases came out of southeastern states.191 Of the traffic-based 
detainers issued throughout the country, 90% were pursuant to a jail 
enforcement agreement, 9% pursuant to a hybrid agreement, and less 
than 1% were based on a task force agreement.192 The southeastern 
figures are the same.193 These numbers suggest that the police officers 
responsible for the most traffic-based arrests leading to ICE detainers 
were patrol officers with no specific authority or mandate to enforce 
immigration law. Patrol officers do not need 287(g) authority to support 
 
189 See infra Part IV for further discussion about the perceived foreignness of 
Latinos in the United States. 
190 See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 58–59. ICE data tracked traffic offenses separately 
from other offenses until June 2010. Regardless of how serious the traffic offense was it 
was tracked in the separate category of traffic offenses. Traffic offenses could include 
driving without a license or having a broken tail light, in addition to more serious 
offenses like vehicular homicide or driving under the influence. ICE’s priorities indicate 
that Level one and two offenders are “serious criminals,” while Level three and traffic 
offenders are not. Based on ICE’s prioritization, I treat the traffic offenses as not serious 
offenses. Id. at 18 n.54. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and Maricopa Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Office 17 (Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/ 
memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/r_287gmaricopacountyso102609.pdf 
[hereinafter Maricopa 287(g) Agreement]; Memorandum of Agreement Between Immigration 
& Customs Enforcement of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and Pima Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t 17 (Oct. 
15, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/ 
r_287gpimacounty101509.pdf [hereinafter Pima 287(g) Agreement]. 
191 The Migration Policy Institute has noted that the ten sites with the largest 
share of detainers for traffic violations were in the Southeast. CAPPS ET AL., supra note 
7, at 2, 58–59. 
192 See id. at 58–59. The ten jurisdictions with the highest number of traffic-based 
detainers had jail enforcement agreements. Id.; Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration 
Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, supra note 146. 
193 CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 58–59. 
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immigration enforcement; they just need to operate within a jurisdiction 
in which the immigration status of all arrested individuals is checked. 
A. Discretion 
287(g), Secure Communities, and state law requiring immigration 
status checks of all individuals booked into jail are powerful tools for 
local law enforcement agents interested in reducing the number of 
unauthorized migrants living within their jurisdiction. Patrol officers 
have a significant amount of discretion to decide whom to arrest and 
detain.194 This discretion allows local law enforcement officials to 
determine whose immigration status will be checked. 
1. Enforcement Priorities 
Jail enforcement agreements identify priorities for arrest and 
detention, but local law enforcement agents are not prohibited from 
pursuing low priority noncitizens.195 The agreements only state that 
“[r]esources should be prioritized” in accordance with the enforcement 
priorities.196 The highest priority is Level one criminal aliens, followed by 
Level two, and Level three. Level one includes “[a]liens who have been 
convicted of or arrested for major drug offenses and/or violent offenses 
such as murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, and kidnapping.”197 Level 
two is “[a]liens who have been convicted of or arrested for minor drug 
offenses and/or mainly property offenses such as burglary, larceny, 
fraud, and money laundering.”198 Level three is noncitizens “who have 
been convicted of or arrested for other offenses.”199 Nothing in the 
287(g) agreement prohibits local law enforcement officers from using 
the program to identify unauthorized migrants through traffic violations. 
Statistics from southeastern states indicate that these priorities are 
not being operationalized. In southeastern states operating with 287(g) 
jail or hybrid enforcement agreements 38.2% of detainers issued were 
based on Level two and Level three offenses.200 Level one offenses only 
accounted for 15.4% of detainers issued.201 
ICE retains supervisory authority over local law enforcement officers 
operating pursuant to 287(g).202 The failure of ICE officials to discourage 
 
194 MOTOMURA, supra note 135, at 4–5; see also Motomura, The Discretion That 
Matters, supra note 135, at 1829, 1842–49. 
195 See, e.g., Maricopa 287(g) Agreement, supra, note 190, at 17; Pima 287(g) 
Agreement, supra, note 190, at 17. 
196 Maricopa 287(g) Agreement, supra, note 190, at 17. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 58–59. 
201 Id. The remaining detainers were based on traffic offenses, other offenses, or 
no offenses, which are recorded separately. Id. 
202 See, e.g., Maricopa 287(g) Agreement, supra note 190, at 6. 
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traffic offense-based arrests suggests that this approach is acceptable to 
ICE. The Migration Policy Institute found that there was significant 
agreement between ICE supervisors and local jurisdictions.203 In 
jurisdictions like Cobb County, where there is a high number of traffic 
offense-based arrests, ICE supervisors reported that “ICE and the 287(g) 
jurisdictions together have sufficient resources to detain and remove all 
unauthorized immigrants identified by 287(g) officers, regardless of the 
severity of the criminal offenses.”204 These supervisors also contended that 
traffic violations represented “a public safety threat significant enough to 
warrant removal.”205 This sentiment is shared by various local jurisdictions 
that seek to apprehend as many unauthorized migrants as possible.206 The 
Davidson County Sheriff’s office in Tennessee contends that “processing 
misdemeanors makes the Nashville community safer.”207 This conclusion 
is based on data that “75 percent of vehicular homicides by illegal aliens 
would have been prevented if their previous misdemeanor arrests had led 
to deportation.”208 Sheriffs in Frederick, Cobb, and Gwinnett counties 
expressed similar sentiments. Charles Jenkins, the Sheriff in Frederick 
County, Maryland, testified before Congress that “the enormous increase 
in crime in the United States . . . can be tied directly to the unchecked 
flow of illegal immigrants through our southern border with Mexico.”209 
The Cobb County Sheriff’s Office website states, “If someone is here 
illegally and commits a crime, whether a misdemeanor or a felony, they 
should be subject to deportation.”210 Gwinnett County Sheriff Butch 
Conway contends that unlicensed drivers are a public safety threat: 
“Those people that haven’t shown a proficiency in driving, I think they 
are dangerous out on the road.”211 
In jurisdictions where ICE supervisors take a different position, there 
are fewer traffic offense-based arrests. For example, ICE supervisors in 
Prince William County, Maryland have steered officers toward Level one 
and Level two offenders and away from traffic offenses.212 In Prince 
William County, the ICE supervisors see civil immigration enforcement as 
an important, but secondary priority. The first priority is gangs, drugs, 
 
203 CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 25. 
204 Id. at 26. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 10. 
207 DAVIDSON CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, supra note 38, at 14. 
208 Id. 
209 Examining 287(g): The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement in Immigration Law: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. 20 (2010) (statement of 
Charles A. Jenkins, Sheriff, Frederick Cnty., Md.). 
210 Immigration and Customs Enforcement Frequently Asked Questions, COBB  
CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.cobbsheriff.org/news/08-01-
12%20%20287%28g%29%20Frequently%20Asked%20Questions%20and%20Stats.htm. 
211 Andria Simmons, Is Sheriff a Hero or Racial Profiler?, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 
12, 2009, at A1. 
212 CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 25. 
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smuggling, and national security threats rather than generally identifying 
unauthorized migrants.213 
Regional ICE offices play an important role in determining local law 
enforcement’s priorities in immigration enforcement. In numerous 
jurisdictions, the supervisory ICE officials appear to have concluded that 
they have the resources to pursue Level three noncitizens.214 As a result, 
traffic stops have become an important immigration enforcement tool. 
2. Citation or Custodial Arrest? 
In jurisdictions where identifying unauthorized migrants is viewed as 
an appropriate goal for 287(g) programs, the significant discretion that 
local law enforcement officers have to stop and arrest an individual is an 
asset.215 The manner in which this discretion is exercised has led to 
critiques that law enforcement agents are using traffic offenses and other 
misdemeanors as a pretext for ascertaining immigration status. Driving 
without a license is a traffic violation, but officers have the discretion to 
either issue a citation or arrest an individual who does not have a driver’s 
license. Tennessee has a “cite and release” statute. Law enforcement 
officers are required to issue a citation for driving without a license, but 
are allowed to arrest an individual and take him into custody if there is a 
“reasonable likelihood that the offense would continue,” a “reasonable 
likelihood . . . that the arrested person will fail to appear in court,” or 
“[t]he person arrested cannot or will not offer satisfactory evidence of 
identification.”216 North Carolina, Virginia, and Georgia have similar “cite 
 
213 Id. 
214 But see Tom Smith, ‘Our Hands Are Tied’: Officers Frustrated with Lack of Federal 
Support on Immigration Law, TIMESDAILY.COM, (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.timesdaily.com/ 
stories/Our-hands-are-tied,186911 (reporting that the ICE office in Huntsville, 
Alabama is only willing to issue detainers for individuals identified by local law 
enforcement officials if they have a felony charge).  
215 See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 135, at 4–5; Motomura, The Discretion That 
Matters, supra note 135, at 1842–49. 
216 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-118 (2006); see NASHVILLE METRO. POLICE DEP’T, 
GENERAL ORDER NO. 05-14, STATE MISDEMEANOR ARREST CITATIONS 2–3 (June 22, 
2005), available at http://www.tnimmigrant.org/storage/misc/Metro_PD_Policy_on_ 
Arrests._vs_Citations%206-2008.pdf. The Nashville Metropolitan Police Department 
internal policy states that officers shall issue citations for state misdemeanor offenses 
when the “officer has reasonable proof of the identity of the suspected 
misdemeanant.” Id. at 1. Alternatively when the individual arrested “cannot or will 
not offer satisfactory evidence of identification” the officer is prohibited from issuing 
a citation and must physically arrest the individual. Id. at 2–3. What forms of 
identification are considered valid has been an issue in Tennessee. Nashville Police 
Department’s internal policy states that photo identifications like government, 
employee, military, or school identification are preferred. Id. at 4. Other acceptable, 
but less desirable, forms of identification include computer verified information, 
vehicle registrations and titles, government food or housing documents, voter 
registration cards, club/fraternal/service organization membership cards, social 
security cards, birth certificates, jail identification, parole/probation documents, and 
rent or utility receipts. Id. Identification documents from an immigrant’s country of 
origin have not always been accepted as satisfactory identification. For example, 
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and release” statues.217 In Virginia, officers are allowed to arrest a driver if 
the officer reasonably believes the driver will disregard the summons or 
will cause harm to himself or another person.218 Georgia has been 
concerned about unauthorized migrants driving without driver’s licenses 
and enacted harsher penalties to address driving without a license. State 
law requires that an individual guilty of driving without a license be 
fingerprinted and imprisoned for two days to twelve months.219 A fine 
between $500 and $1,000 can also be imposed.220 
The discretion that officers exercise in deciding whether to issue a 
citation or arrest a driver determines whether or not a driver’s 
immigration status will be checked. This discretion bolsters the role that 
patrol officers without 287(g) task force authority can play in 
immigration enforcement. Officers who exercise that discretion in ways 
 
Juana Villegas was stopped for a traffic violation. Julia Preston, Immigrant, Pregnant,  
Is Jailed Under Pact, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, at A13. Juana did not have a  
driver’s license, but provided a valid consular identification card, which contains a 
photo. 287(g) in Tennessee, TENN. IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE RTS. COAL., 
http://www.tnimmigrant.org/287g. The officer did not accept this as valid 
identification, allegedly stating that he believed that she was “illegal,” and he arrested 
her. Id.; Preston, supra. Juana Villegas was also nine months pregnant and gave birth 
with sheriff’s officers standing guard at her hospital bed where her feet were 
frequently cuffed to the bed. Preston, supra. When consular identification cards and 
other forms of identification are accepted as satisfactory identification unauthorized 
migrants avoid a custodial arrest and the mandatory immigration status check that 
accompanies a custodial arrest. 
217 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-35 (2011) (driving without a license is a Class 2 
misdemeanor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-302 (authorizing the issuance of a citation for 
misdemeanors); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401 (authorizing an officer to arrest without a 
warrant if the officer has probable cause that an offense was committed in her 
presence); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74.A.1 (2008) (requiring officer to issue a summons 
for Class 1 and 2 misdemeanors and release the detained individual); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 46.2-300 (2010) (first offense of driving without a license is a Class 2 misdemeanor, 
second offense is a Class 1 misdemeanor); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20 (2008) (general 
arrest authority), GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-23 (authority to issue a citation for motor 
vehicle violations in lieu of custodial arrest); Brock v. State, 396 S.E.2d 785, 786 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-23(a) retains officer’s ability to 
effectuate a custodial arrest when a citation is allowed). In a case involving a driver 
with a Mexican driver’s license who failed to maintain his lane, the Georgia Court of 
Appeals held that the officer was within his statutory discretion to arrest the driver for 
failure to maintain his lane. Lopez v. State, 650 S.E.2d 430, 432–33 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2007). While the driver, Lopez, had a valid Mexican driver’s license he could not 
provide his Georgia residential address. The Court concluded that the decision to 
arrest under these circumstances was not an abuse of the officer’s discretion. Id. at 433.  
218 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74.A.1. Georgia statute does not provide guidelines or 
criteria regarding when a custodial arrest is allowed or appropriate. North Carolina 
statute only provides such guidelines for misdemeanors that do not occur in the 
presence of an officer. In those instances an arrest is allowed if the individual will not 
be apprehended immediately unless arrested or the individual may cause injury to 
himself or others or damage property unless arrested. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
401(b)(2)(b). 
219 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-121 (2011). 
220 Id. 
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that target Latino communities perpetuate the idea that Latinos are 
foreigners in the United States regardless of their birthplace or 
citizenship status. 
B. Pretext 
Whether a state or local jurisdiction has a 287(g) agreement, 
participates in Secure Communities, the Criminal Alien Program, or has 
a state law requiring jailers to ascertain immigration status, law 
enforcement officials can use minor traffic offenses as a pretext for 
ascertaining immigration status. With an increasing number of states 
requiring individuals to prove lawful residence in the United States to 
obtain a driver’s license, traffic offenses have become an important 
immigration enforcement tool.221 Once stopped for a traffic offense the 
inability to provide a driver’s license or adequate identification allows a 
patrol officer to arrest the driver. Residents of Latino communities 
believe that they are subject to extra patrols in which they are stopped “to 
verify they are wearing a seatbelt that is visibly fastened, for driving less 
than 5 mph over the speed limit, or for no reason at all.”222 Statistics from 
certain jurisdictions support this perception.223 
In localities such as Bedford County, Tennessee, residents contend 
that they encounter roadblocks and extra patrols in Latino communities 
and near Latino grocery stores and markets.224 At the roadblocks, vehicles 
were stopped to check for driver’s licenses and identification. Since these 
checks occurred at roadblocks, the law enforcement officers did not have 
to identify a specific traffic violation before approaching the vehicle.225 
Decisions to place numerous roadblocks in Latino communities are 
perceived by members of these communities as an indication that law 
enforcement officials believe individuals within these communities are 
likely to be unauthorized migrants. Such actions perpetuate the idea that 
those of Latino descent are foreigners and unauthorized. 
These stops allow law enforcement officers to check for a driver’s 
license and arrest the driver if she is unable to produce one. Once 
arrested, the immigration status check begins at the jail. Since these 
patrol officers are not operating pursuant to a 287(g) task force 
agreement, they have no authority to stop an individual to inquire about 
 
221 Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future of 
Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213 (2004). 
222 WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6. 
223 See infra text accompanying notes 234–40. 
224 WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6; see also ACLU COBB, supra note 159, 
at 110–11 (reporting similar incidents); ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159, at 16 (same). 
225 It is unclear what the nature of the roadblocks at issue were, but police 
officers can conduct administrative searches such as sobriety or border checkpoints 
without having individualized suspicion of unlawful activity. See Eve Brensike Primus, 
Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 255 (2011); see also 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562, 566 (1976). 
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their immigration status. Traffic violations provide a legitimate basis for 
patrol officers to stop an individual and potentially arrest him, at which 
point an immigration status determination will be made at the jail. 
The significant number of traffic offenses and misdemeanors 
underlying ICE detainers in recent years suggests that law enforcement 
officials rely on pretextual traffic stops to identify deportable noncitizens. 
In Irving, Texas, which participates in the Criminal Alien Program, 98% 
of the individuals arrested and detained by ICE had been “charged with 
misdemeanor offenses.”226 Thirty percent of the ICE detainers issued 
pursuant to 287(g) agreements in 2010 were based on traffic offenses.227 
Yet, in certain southeastern jurisdictions, traffic offenses account for over 
half of all ICE detainers issued in 2010.228 For example, in Cobb County, 
Georgia 67% of the ICE detainers issued were due to a traffic offense.229 
The figure for Davidson County in Tennessee was 57%, and it was 52% in 
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina.230 
In numerous jurisdictions throughout the Southeast minor traffic 
offenses are being used to identify unauthorized migrants. The targeted 
use of this enforcement strategy in Latino communities leaves its 
residents with the impression that they are being targeted. The 
perception of targeting contributes to a hostile environment. Drivers are 
not being stopped because a broken tail light is a public safety threat, but 
because the officer wants to check the driver’s immigration status. 
Enforcement strategies that alienate Latinos based on their ethnicity and 
presumed immigration status negatively shape Latino immigrants’ 
perceptions about their possible social mobility within U.S. society. 
C. Racial Profiling 
The U.S. Department of Justice has defined “racial profiling” as 
the invidious use of race or ethnicity as a criterion in conducting 
stops, searches and other law enforcement investigative procedures. 
It is premised on the erroneous assumption that any particular 
individual of one race or ethnicity is more likely to engage in 
misconduct than any particular individual of another race or 
ethnicity.231 
 
226 GARDNER & KOHLI, supra note 163, at 2. Within the same time period the 
Irving police arrested significantly higher numbers of Latinos for Class-C 
misdemeanors than they did African Americans or Whites. Id. at 5 & fig.1. Class-C 
misdemeanors are the least serious group of misdemeanors. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 12.03 (West 2011). 
227 See supra note 190. 
228 CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 58–59. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE 
BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/about/spl/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf; see also DEBORAH RAMIREZ ET AL., A 
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Many individuals within Latino communities in the Southeast believe 
that Latinos are stopped for minor traffic violations so that the officers 
can ascertain the driver’s immigration status. Recent data analyzed by the 
Warren Institute at Berkeley Law School and the Department of Justice 
supports the existence of racial profiling in Arizona and nationwide.232 
The Warren Institute has found that since the inception of Secure 
Communities, 93% of the individuals identified for deportation through 
Secure Communities have been Latinos.233 Even if the majority of 
individuals identified for deportation are unauthorized migrants, in 2010 
Latinos only accounted for approximately 78% of the unauthorized 
migrant population.234 The Department of Justice has concluded that the 
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) engaged in pervasive and 
systematic racial profiling. MCSO participated in Secure Communities 
and had 287(g) jail enforcement and task force agreements until 
December 2011.235 Based on a statistical analysis of the MCSO’s 
immigration enforcement program, Latino drivers were four to nine 
times more likely to be subject to a traffic stop than similarly situated 
 
RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS: PROMISING 
PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED 3 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/bja/184768.pdf (defining “racial profiling” as “any police-initiated action 
that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national origin rather than the behavior of an 
individual or information that leads the police to a particular individual who has 
been identified as being, or having been, engaged in criminal activity.”). 
232 The Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) has critiqued the methodology of 
this report. See, e.g., W.D. Reasoner & Jessica Vaughan, Secure Communities by the 
Numbers, Revisited: Analyzing the Analysis (Part 2 of 3), CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Mar. 
2012), http://www.cis.org/articles/2012/reasoner-vaughan-secure-communities-PART-
2.pdf. CIS contends that the Warren Institute should not have assumed that all 
individuals from Latin American countries are Latinos. Using the same methodology 
CIS found that 92.6% of those identified for deportation were Latino. Id. at 4. CIS 
seeks to distinguish non-mestizo Amerindians from Spanish-speaking Latinos. While 
these are important distinctions to make within Latin American country populations, 
in the United States these groups tend to be grouped together as Latino. The broad 
application of this term has been critiqued as grouping dissimilar individuals together 
based on country of origin, yet this practice has persisted. See, e.g., MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ 
R., supra note 79. Current usage of the term Latino in the United States seriously 
undermines this aspect of CIS’ critique. 
233 AARTI KOHLI ET AL., SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 5–6 (2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley. 
edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf. 
234 HOEFER ET AL., supra note 26, at 4. 
235 The Department of Homeland Security did not renew Maricopa County 
Sheriff’s Office’s 287(g) task force agreement in 2009; it terminated the office’s 
287(g) jail enforcement agreement in December 2011 and restricted the office’s 
access to Secure Communities in December 2011. Randal C. Archibold, Immigration 
Hard-Liner Has His Wings Clipped, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A14; Press Release, Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Napolitano on DOJ’s Findings of Discriminatory 
Policing in Maricopa County, (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/ 
12/15/secretary-napolitano-dojs-findings-discriminatory-policing-maricopa-county; see 
also Editorial, The Case Against Sheriff Arpaio, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at A24. 
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non-Latino drivers.236 The expert conducting the statistical analysis noted 
that this was “the most egregious racial profiling in the United States that 
he has ever personally seen in the course of his work, observed in 
litigation, or reviewed in professional literature.”237 Additionally the DOJ 
found that the MCSO’s Human Smuggling Unit stopped, detained, 
and/or arrested Latino drivers without adequate cause.238 Approximately 
20% of the traffic-related incident reports from this unit “contained 
information indicating that the stops, almost all of which involved Latino 
drivers, were conducted without reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause.”239 
The use of racial profiling creates a hostile environment because 
Latino immigrants feel harassed, disrespected, and unwelcome.240 This 
enforcement strategy legitimates law enforcement agents seeing Latinos 
as potential “illegal immigrants” rather than lawful residents or citizens 
because of their ethnic appearance. These types of pretextual traffic 
stops perpetuate the idea that Latino appearance is linked to 
foreignness.241 The long-term consequence of this enforcement strategy is 
to leave Latino immigrants with the impression that naturalization will 
not provide the same opportunities for social mobility that it provides to 
other immigrants because they will always be perceived as foreign and 
possibly “illegal.” While racial profiling has generally been condemned as 
a legitimate police practice, its legal status in immigration enforcement is 
less clear. The following sections provide an analysis of the jurisprudence 
that supports the use of pretextual traffic stops to enforce immigration 
law and examples of racial profiling as an immigration enforcement 
strategy. 
1. Legal Support for Racial Profiling 
While the United States Supreme Court has not endorsed racial 
profiling in the immigration context, it has given immigration 
enforcement officers a great deal of latitude in using ethnicity to 
establish reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence in the United States. 
There are few legal checks to constrain immigration enforcement 
officers’ use of ethnicity to identify unauthorized migrants. The legal 
 
236 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Ass’t. Atty. Gen. of the U.S., Civil Rights Div., 
U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Atty. for Maricopa Cnty., Ariz. 6 (Dec. 
15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_ 
findletter_12-15-11.pdf. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id.  
240 See, e.g., WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6; ACLU COBB, supra note 
159; ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159; LACAYO, supra note 159.  
241 See JIMÉNEZ, supra note 79, at 140–41; MIA TUAN, FOREVER FOREIGNERS OR 
HONORARY WHITES?: THE ASIAN ETHNIC EXPERIENCE TODAY 250 (1998); Fatma E. 
Marouf, Regrouping America: Immigration Policies and the Reduction of Prejudice, 15 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 129, 157–63 (2012). 
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system’s failure to provide sufficient checks exacerbates the hostile 
environment in which Latino immigrants live. 
In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court held that pretextual stops do not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Whren the Court 
decided that probable cause that a traffic violation is occurring is a per se 
justification for a stop.242 Once it is determined that an officer has 
probable cause to make the traffic stop the Fourth Amendment inquiry is 
over.243 If officers use minor traffic violations as a pretext to determine if 
a driver has a driver’s license or has violated other traffic laws like 
wearing a seatbelt there is no Fourth Amendment problem unless there 
was no probable cause for the initial stop.244 The significant amount of 
discretion that officers have to make traffic stops means that 
considerations such as race could “seep into the [probable cause] 
calculus.”245 The Supreme Court has acknowledged this possibility and 
contends that the Equal Protection Clause provides the basis for 
addressing concerns about racial profiling.246 In the immigration context 
few legal protections exist to combat racial profiling. 
In 1975, the Court held that “Mexican appearance” is a relevant, 
although insufficient, factor giving rise to probable cause that an 
individual is unlawfully present in the United States.247 The Immigration 
and Naturalization Act empowers immigration enforcement officers to 
“interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to 
be or to remain in the United States.”248 In United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce,249 the Court applied the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion 
standard to Border Patrol stops. The Court held that the Border Patrol is 
only authorized to stop individuals “if they are aware of specific 
articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that 
reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be 
 
242 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
243 Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death 
of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145, 165 (1996). 
244 Anecdotal information suggests that probable cause may not exist in a 
number of traffic stops involving Latino drivers. Latino drivers in Tennessee and 
Georgia have reported being pulled over and not told the reason for the stop. After 
the drivers provide a driver’s license they are released. ACLU COBB, supra note 159; 
ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159; WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159. To the 
extent these types of stops are occurring, the Fourth Amendment rights of the drivers 
are being violated. ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159, at 18. In such cases the drivers 
believe that they have been stopped because of their Latino appearance. ACLU COBB, 
supra note 159, at 9–11; ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159, at 12, 16. 
245 Levit, supra note 243, at 167. 
246 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. 
247 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975). 
248 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 287(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) 
(2006). 
249 422 U.S. 873. 
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illegally in the country.”250 “Mexican appearance” alone does not create 
reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence. The Court noted that “[l]arge 
numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical 
characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the border 
area a relatively small portion of them are aliens.”251 Yet the Court 
concluded that “Mexican appearance” is a relevant factor because the 
“likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is 
high.”252 
Despite the incongruence of these statements, current law allows 
immigration enforcement officers to consider ethnicity as a factor in 
establishing reasonable suspicion regarding immigration status. Ethnicity 
is one of many factors that officers can consider because “Mexican 
appearance” alone “does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to 
ask if they are aliens.”253 Some of the other factors include “characteristics 
of the area in which [the officers] encounter a vehicle,”254 “the driver’s 
behavior,”255 “[a]spects of the vehicle,”256 and “characteristic appearance 
of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of 
dress and haircut.”257 
The Court’s conclusion regarding the relevance of “Mexican 
appearance” was based on the government’s estimate that 85% of 
unauthorized migrants in the United States at the time were from 
 
250 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884. The Court had earlier held that probable 
cause was needed for Border Patrol officers to search vehicles at a fixed checkpoint 
or pursuant to a roving-patrol search. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) 
(fixed checkpoints); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (roving 
patrols). In 1976 the Court distinguished between searches and stops in which an 
individual is asked about their immigration status. In the latter situation, Border 
Patrol officers do not need individualized suspicion to stop and question an 
individual at a fixed checkpoint. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 
(1976). Even if the stop is based “largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry” 
the Court “perceive[d] no constitutional violation.” Id. at 563. Brignoni-Ponce’s 
requirement of individualized reasonable suspicion for stops pursuant to a roving-
patrol survived Martinez-Fuerte. The Court specifically noted that criteria sustaining the 
stop and questioning in Martinez-Fuerte “would not sustain a roving-patrol stop.” Id. 
251 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886. 
252 Id. at 886–87. 
253 Id. at 887. 
254 Id. at 884. 
255 Id. at 885. Examples of “[t]he driver’s behavior” include driving erratically or 
obviously attempting to evade officers. Id. 
256 Id. “Aspects of the vehicle” includes factors such as “certain station wagons, 
with large compartments for fold-down seats or spare tires,” a “heavily loaded” 
appearance, a large number of passengers, or if the officers notice individuals trying 
to hide. Id. 
257 Id.; see also Chacón, supra note 11, at 145–46; Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal 
Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 70–72 
(2010); Johnson, supra note 30, at 1024. 
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Mexico.258 It is doubtful that these numbers were correct. The 1981 final 
report of the U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 
stated, “Mexican nationals probably account for less than half of the 
undocumented/illegal population.”259 In 2010, the Department of 
Homeland Security estimated that Mexican nationals account for 61% of 
the unauthorized migrant population.260 While the Mexican percentage 
of the unauthorized migrant population has increased since 1975, the 
majority of individuals in the United States of Mexican ancestry are U.S. 
citizens or lawfully present migrants. 
In 2010, approximately 78% of the unauthorized migrants in the 
United States were from Mexico, Central America, and South America. 
Based on these types of statistics, the Supreme Court and others 
conclude that it is more likely that a Latino is an unauthorized migrant. 
Yet the overwhelming majority of Latinos in the United States are U.S. 
citizens or lawfully present migrants. Available statistics suggest that 
83.5% of the Latino population in the United States is within these 
categories.261 Approximately 74% of the Latino population are U.S. 
citizens, either by birth or naturalization, and 9.5% are lawful migrants.262 
Based on the logic offered by the U.S. Supreme Court, lower courts, and 
law enforcement officials, that ethnicity is a relevant factor in identifying 
unauthorized migrants, being an African-American is probative of being 
an NBA player. The majority of NBA players are African-American; 
therefore being African-American is relevant in determining if a specific 
individual is an NBA player. Since the majority of African-Americans are 
not NBA players, race does not provide particularly useful information 
regarding NBA player status. Factors such as height and athletic ability 
are much more probative. Similarly, Mexican appearance is being used as 
a factor for ascertaining immigration status when other factors are much 
more probative. 
The Ninth Circuit agreed and held that “Hispanic appearance,” even 
when considered with other factors, does not assist in establishing 
reasonable suspicion of being unlawfully present.263 In United States v. 
Montero-Camargo the court acknowledged Brignoni-Ponce’s statement on 
 
258 Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 
WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 694 (2000). 
259 SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POL’Y, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 
AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 36 (1981), reprinted in H. AND S. COMMS. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
97TH CONG., JOINT COMM. PRINT NO. 8 (1981). This statement was based on data from 
the U.S. Census Bureau. Johnson, supra note 258, at 695 & n.96. 
260 HOEFER ET AL., supra note 26, at 4. 
261 Id.; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates:  
Sex by Age by Citizenship Status (Hispanic or Latino), AMERICAN FACTFINDER (2010), 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/10_1YR/B05003I. 
262 HOEFER ET AL., supra note 26, at 4; U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 260. Lawful 
migrants includes individuals present pursuant to both immigrant and nonimmigrant 
visas. 
263 United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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the matter but held that the Supreme Court’s decision was based on 
“outdated demographic information.”264 At the time the Ninth Circuit 
issued its decision, the Latino population throughout the country had 
grown tremendously such that Latinos were a majority or substantial part 
of the population in many parts of the country, particularly those near 
the border.265 Based on this demographic information, the court 
concluded that the likelihood that anyone of “Hispanic ancestry is in fact 
an alien, let alone an illegal alien, is not high enough to make Hispanic 
appearance a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.”266 The 
court emphasized the need for individualized suspicion and concluded 
that “Hispanic appearance is of little or no use in determining which 
particular individuals among the vast Hispanic populace should be 
stopped by law enforcement officials on the lookout for illegal aliens.”267 
This approach has not been adopted outside of the Ninth Circuit. 
The Supreme Court’s tolerance for the use of ethnicity in 
establishing reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence reinforces the 
idea that ethnicity is a marker of foreignness and immigration status. 
Approval of the connection between ethnicity, foreignness, and 
immigration status undermines the idea that the social benefits of 
citizenship are equally available to all. 
2. Racial Profiling in Practice 
The continued use of Latino appearance as a factor in determining 
who is unlawfully present in the United States disproportionately burdens 
one segment of the population, the majority of whom are U.S. citizens or 
lawful immigrants.268 As the Latino population in the United States has 
grown more diverse, the relevance of “Mexican appearance” has been 
expanded to Latino appearance.269 As with the Mexican ancestry 
population, the majority of the Latino population in the United States is 
comprised of U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants.270 Yet the perception of 
foreignness continues to attach to Latino ethnicity. Research by social 
psychologists demonstrates “‘a very consistent and robust’ association 
 
264 Id. at 1132. 
265 Id. at 1133. 
266 Id. at 1132. 
267 Id. at 1134. 
268 Justice Brennan raised a similar concern in his dissent in Martinez-Fuerte. He 
noted that the Court’s decision authorized the Border Patrol to “target motorists of 
Mexican appearance. The process will then inescapably discriminate against citizens 
of Mexican ancestry and Mexican aliens lawfully in this country for no other reason 
than that they unavoidably possess the same ‘suspicious’ physical and grooming 
characteristics of illegal Mexican aliens.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543, 572 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
269 Johnson, supra note 258, at 698. 
270 SETH MOTEL & EILEEN PATTEN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE 10 LARGEST HISPANIC 
ORIGIN GROUPS: CHARACTERISTICS, RANKINGS, TOP COUNTIES 10 (2012), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/06/The-10-Largest-Hispanic-Origin-Groups.pdf. 
LCB_16_4_Art_2_Banks.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/9/2013  9:02 PM 
1194 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:4 
between American identity and Whiteness.”271 A study of Caucasian 
Americans and Latino Americans found that both groups explicitly and 
implicitly saw Latino Americans as less American than Caucasian 
Americans.272 Other studies have found similar results for Asian 
Americans and African Americans.273 The scholars involved in this 
research conclude that the research findings suggest that “a very basic 
right to a national identity is not equally available to all Americans,” 
because “national identity is more readily granted to members of the 
dominant ethnic group than to members of an ethnic minority.”274 For 
Latinos in the United States, this can mean being perceived as a 
noncitizen rather than a citizen. 
In 2008, the Pew Hispanic Center reported that approximately 9% of 
Latino adults in the United States (native-born, U.S. citizens, and 
immigrants) had been asked about their immigration status by a police 
officer or other government official in the last year.275 Citizens have even 
been apprehended by ICE and held for questioning. The Warren 
Institute found that 1.6% of individuals apprehended by ICE pursuant to 
Secure Communities were U.S. citizens.276 Despite naturalizing and 
becoming U.S. citizens, some Latino citizens are subject to apprehension 
by ICE because local law enforcement agents target them and ICE 
databases are incomplete.277 Knowledge that one can be arrested and 
subsequently detained by ICE despite being a U.S. citizen suggests that 
naturalization will not provide a presumption of belonging or preclude 
 
271 Marouf, supra note 241, at 157 (quoting Theirry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, 
American = White?, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 447, 463 (2005)). 
272 Thierry Devos et al., Say “Adios” to the American Dream? The Interplay Between 
Ethnic and National Identity Among Latino and Caucasian Americans, 16 CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 37 (2010). 
273 Marouf, supra note 241, at 157–58 (citing studies). 
274 Devos et al., supra note 272, at 47; see also JIMÉNEZ, supra note 79, at 160; TUAN, 
supra note 241, at 18. 
275 MARK HUGO LOPEZ & SUSAN MINUSHKIN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., 2008 NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF LATINOS: HISPANICS SEE THEIR SITUATION IN THE U.S. DETERIORATING; 
OPPOSE KEY IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT MEASURES 9 (2008), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/93.pdf. The rate was higher for Latinos 18 to 
29 years old—15%—and significantly lower for those over age 55—4%. Id. The 
figures dropped to 5% of Latino adults in the United States in 2010, however, the 
figure for Latino men was 8%. MARK HUGO LOPEZ ET AL., PEW HISPANIC CTR., ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRATION BACKLASH WORRIES, DIVIDES LATINOS 12 (2010), available at 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/128.pdf. 
276 KOHLI ET AL., supra note 233, at 4. ICE Director John Morton responded to 
this information by stating that “[i]t would be irresponsible for us not to investigate 
someone who is suspected of a crime and has some record of being foreign born.” 
Julia Preston, Latinos Said to Bear Weight of a Deportation Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 
2011, at A16. See also supra note 232. 
277 See, e.g., Julia Preston, Immigration Crackdown Also Snares Americans, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 14, 2011, at A20. 
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one from ICE’s jurisdiction.278 Denial of these benefits of citizenship may 
cause some Latino immigrants to conclude that the benefits of 
naturalization do not outweigh the costs.279 
Latino residents of Bedford County in Tennessee feel that regardless 
of immigration status one is “marked out if you have dark skin, hair, or if 
you speak English with [an] accent.”280 In Alabama it has been alleged 
that 58% of the vehicle searches done by one specific state trooper were 
conducted with Latino motorists, even though Latinos account for only 
2% of Alabama’s population.281 In Shelbyville, Tennessee, public records 
indicate that the local police department arrested a disproportionate 
number of Latino drivers for traffic violations in the first quarter of 
2011.282 Thirty-five percent of those arrested were Latino, even though 
Latinos only make up approximately 20% of Shelbyville’s population.283 
As has been reported in other jurisdictions, it appears that a few officers 
made the majority of the arrests of Latino drivers.284 Four officers were 
responsible for 62% of the arrests of Latino drivers for traffic violations.285 
Shelbyville officers are not assigned a specific area to patrol, but rather 
patrol throughout the city. This suggests “that some officers may be 
intentionally targeting Latino drivers for traffic stops and arrests, perhaps 
in order to facilitate detention by ICE.”286 
 
278 ICE only has jurisdiction over noncitizens. See Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006). 
279 The costs associated with naturalization include time, money, and a potential 
risk of being deported. The filing fee for a naturalization application is $595 plus an 
$85.00 biometric fee. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.7(b)(1)(i)(C), 103.7(b)(1)(i)(XX) (2012). 
Applicants frequently pay for English classes and classes on U.S. history and civics. 
MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION FEE INCREASES IN CONTEXT 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS15_CitizenshipFees2007.pdf. Other costs 
include photographs and hiring an attorney to prepare the application. Id. Time is 
spent gathering the necessary information for the application and putting it together. 
A potential risk is involved because one of the naturalization requirements is being a 
person of good moral character. If during the process of reviewing the application 
the government concludes that an individual does not have good moral character 
due to a criminal conviction, the applicant may be eligible for deportation. Now the 
applicant is facing deportation proceedings rather than a naturalization ceremony. 
See Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S. Citizenship, 87 
IND. L.J. 1571 (2012); Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed., Rays of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, 
at A15 (describing how this happened to Mary Anne Gerhis). 
280 WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6. 
281 Daniel C. Vock, Police Join Feds to Tackle Immigration, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Nov. 
27, 2007), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/police-join-feds-
to-tackle-immigration-85899386665. 
282 WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6. 
283 Id. Latinos also accounted for 39% of the arrests for driving license violations. Id. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. at 7. 
286 Id. 
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Latino drivers report being stopped frequently for minor traffic 
violations or being stopped without probable cause of wrongdoing.287 For 
example, in Georgia individuals report being pulled over for crossing the 
white line, expired registration, improper or incomplete stop at a stop 
sign, and failing to dim headlights.288 The officers’ conduct during traffic 
stops has given some drivers pause as to whether the stop was a pretext to 
ascertain immigration status. For example, Gabriel was ticketed for an 
improper stop at a stop sign. Gabriel had been extra careful to make a 
full and complete stop at the intersection because he knew this was an 
area frequented by county police officers.289 The officers did not tell 
Gabriel the reason for the stop, but they issued him a ticket for an 
improper stop and arrested him for driving without a driver’s license.290 
Gabriel noticed several cars passed through the stop sign without making 
a complete stop before he was pulled over. None of those cars were 
stopped by the police officers and Gabriel thinks that the fact that the 
individuals in those vehicles appeared Caucasian was relevant in the 
officer’s decision to leave them alone.291 Similarly, Rogerio was stopped 
for driving on a closed road in a residential area. Before the police 
officer asked for a driver’s license, he asked Rogerio about his 
immigration status, whether he had an alien registration card, visa, or 
passport.292 Another example involves a Tennessee Highway Patrol State 
Trooper who pulled over a Latino driver for speeding. The driver 
immediately showed the officer his valid driver’s license and proof of 
insurance. At this point the officer asked for the driver’s green card. The 
driver inquired about the officer’s authority to investigate immigration 
status, to which the officer “demanded proof of his citizenship, stating 
that he ‘knew’ the driver ‘was an illegal.’”293 The driver was issued a 
citation for driving without a license, no proof of insurance, and no 
seatbelt, even though the driver had provided a license, evidence of 
insurance, and was visibly wearing a seatbelt.294 
Latino drivers also report being pulled over for reasons that are not 
clear and then given a citation or arrested for traffic violations such as 
driving without a license. Other drivers are not arrested or issued a 
citation, but they are never provided with an explanation for the stop.295 
 
287 Organizations such as the ACLU, the National Council of La Raza, and the 
Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition have documented allegations of 
racial profiling in southeastern states related to local immigration enforcement. 
ACLU COBB, supra note 159, at 9–13; ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159, at 10–16; 
LACAYO, supra note 159, at 13–19; WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6–7. 
288 ACLU COBB, supra note 159, at 9–13; ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159, at 14. 
289 ACLU COBB, supra note 159, at 10–11. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. at 12. 
293 WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 7. 
294 Id.  
295 ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159, at 10–11. 
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For example, a Gwinnett County sheriff pulled Juan over as he was 
leaving work. Juan asked the officer several times why he had been 
stopped. The officer never answered Juan, but requested his driver’s 
license and “screamed at him for asking questions.”296 Juan produced a 
valid driver’s license and was subsequently released. The officer never 
issued Juan a citation or explained the reason for the stop.297 
While these examples may be written off as mere anecdotes, they 
represent a perception that exists amongst many Latino immigrants—
that they are targeted for immigration enforcement because of their 
ethnicity.298 The Homeland Security Task Force on Secure Communities 
acknowledged the importance of this perception and recommended that 
ICE withhold enforcement action for individuals identified through 
Secure Communities based on a minor traffic offense.299 The Task Force 
noted that such a policy would “reduce the risk of racial profiling or 
other distortions of standard arrest practices followed by arresting or 
correctional officers.”300 
The perception of racial profiling not only contributes to a hostile 
environment, it “could very well cast a shadow on the brightness of the 
American Dream.”301 More specifically, it suggests that the social mobility 
benefits of citizenship may not be equally available. Sociologists Massey 
and Sánchez R. found that while Latino immigrants see the United States 
as a land of opportunity, they also see it as a place of great inequality.302 
Their perceptions of inequality were based on “the high degree of 
prejudice in the United States against minorities, the poor, and those 
who do not speak English.”303 The targeting of those with a Latino 
appearance for immigration status checks also perpetuates the idea that 
Latinos are foreigners. Ethnic appearance is visible in a way that 
citizenship status is not. The benefits of presumed belonging and 
membership within the polity that generally attach to citizenship are 
unavailable as long as one’s appearance suggests that one is a foreigner. 
These perceptions of the United States not only contribute to a hostile 
environment, but also imply that naturalization may not facilitate social 
mobility. 
 
296 Id. at 5. 
297 Id. 
298 ACLU COBB, supra note 159; ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159; KOHLI ET AL., 
supra note 233, at 6; LACAYO, supra note 159, at 6; Rights Working Grp., Faces of 
Racial Profiling: A Report from Communities Across America 5–7 (2010), available at 
http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/sites/default/files/ReportText.pdf; WHITE & 
KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6–7. 
299 TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMTYS., HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, FINDINGS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 22 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities-findings-and-recommendations-report.pdf. 
300 Id. 
301 MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ R., supra note 79, at 124. 
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
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V. DECIDING TO NATURALIZE 
Citizenship is often viewed as the ultimate sign of successful 
incorporation into U.S. society.304 Many have heard people tell stories 
about their older relatives who eagerly awaited the opportunity to 
naturalize because it signaled becoming American. They were anxious to 
claim this identity and so they naturalized at the first available moment. 
This perception of naturalization has been challenged by the idea of 
defensive, instrumental, or protective naturalization that was discussed in 
Part II. Pursuant to this conception of naturalization, immigrants become 
citizens to reap the material benefits of citizenship.305 This Article uses 
the growing research on the social benefits of naturalization to offer an 
additional perspective on the relationship between naturalization and 
incorporation. Rather than seeing the decision to naturalize as a rational 
calculation of material costs and benefits, naturalization can also be 
understood as a statement about immigrants’ sense of acceptance and 
opportunity for mobility within the United States. Exploring these 
aspects of naturalization opens up a wider range of policy options to 
encourage naturalization. It also provides a basis for evaluating existing 
immigrant- and immigration-related policy. 
This Part contends that the social and material benefits of citizenship 
matter in naturalization decisions, and that immigrants’ environment 
provides insight on the relationship between naturalization, perceived 
belonging, and social mobility. The use of minor traffic violations to 
ascertain immigration status contributes to a hostile environment by 
perpetuating the idea that Latinos are foreigners and likely “illegal 
aliens.”306 Repeated experiences with this message suggest that 
naturalization will do little to increase Latino immigrants’ perceived 
belonging and opportunities for social mobility in the United States.307 
 
304 Naturalization is often discussed as “a signifier of assimilation.” Gilbertson & 
Singer, supra note 86, at 26 (citing Smith, supra note 86, at 197). This conception of 
naturalization “corresponds to a national model of citizenship which sees immigrants 
as incorporating as citizens of a single nation-state. According to this view, immigrants 
shed their ‘traditional’ way of life and integrate into the social, cultural and political 
life of the receiving society while severing ties to the origin country. . . . This 
perspective suggests that immigrants become full members of the host society and 
that the logical end point of the integration of immigrants into the receiving society 
is single nation-state citizenship.” Id. (citations omitted). 
305 See, e.g., BORJAS, The Impact of Welfare Reform, supra note 93, at 9; Balistreri & 
Van Hook, supra note 93; Borjas, Welfare Reform and Immigrant Participation, supra note 
93, at 1094; Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 30, 44; Jones-Correa, supra note 93, 
at 41; Ong, supra note 93; Adrian D. Pantoja et al., Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity: 
Patterns in Political Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos, 54 POL. RES. Q. 729, 730 (2001). 
306 Marouf, supra note 241, at 132–33 (noting “persistent association between 
American identity and Whiteness”). 
307 See Jiménez, supra note 79, at 140–41 Tuan, supra note 241, at 18; T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff & Rubén G. Rumbaut, Terms of Belonging: Are Models of Membership Self-
Fulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 24 (1998). 
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A. Variation in Naturalization Rates 
Since 1990 a greater portion of immigrants eligible to naturalize are 
doing so, but the rate for Mexicans is disproportionately low. In 1990, 
37% of the lawfully present foreign-born population had naturalized.308 
By 2005 the percentage had increased to 52%.309 This increase has been 
attributed to a larger number of eligible immigrants and a greater 
likelihood that those eligible will seek citizenship.310 Yet these 
naturalization rates are not even across countries of origin. For example, 
Mexican immigrants accounted for 35% of immigrants eligible to 
naturalize in 2005 yet only accounted for 13% of immigrants who 
naturalized that year.311 Asian immigrants who constituted 19% of eligible 
immigrants made up 39% of the immigrants who naturalized in 2005.312 
Central Americans’ rates are closer to that of Mexicans. In 2005, Central 
Americans accounted for 8% of eligible immigrants but only 5% of 
immigrants who naturalized that year.313 A similar trend is noticeable 
since 1995.314 
 
 
308 PASSEL, supra note 24, at i. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. See also Balistreri & Van Hook, supra note 93, at 114. 
311 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2005 YEARBOOK 
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 53, 55 (2006); PASSEL, supra note 24, at 27. 
312 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 311, at 53 (showing percent who 
naturalized); PASSEL, supra note 24, at 27 (showing percent eligible). 
313 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 311, at 53–55 (showing number 
naturalized from Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
and Panama); PASSEL, supra note 24, at 27 (showing percent eligible). 
314 PASSEL, supra note 24, at 27. In 2000, Mexico, Ecuador, Honduras, El Salvador, 
and Guatemala each had below average naturalization rates ranging from 29.1%–
44.3%. PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61, at 145 (percentage of 
each immigrant group that are naturalized citizens). 
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TABLE 3. Mexican Immigrant Naturalization Rates315
YEAR PERCENT OF LPRS ELIGIBLE 
TO NATURALIZE 
PERCENT OF INDIVIDUALS 
NATURALIZED 
2010 32.2 10.8 
2009 32.7 15.0 
2008 33.3 22.2 
2007 33.7 18.5 
2006 32.1 12.0 
2005 35.2 12.8 
2004 29.8 11.9 
 
The trend of disproportionately low naturalization rates for Mexican 
immigrants has continued, although it has reversed somewhat for Central 
American immigrants since 2007.316 The enactment of the Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) in 1997317 may 
help to explain the increase in Central American naturalization rates. 
NACARA made it easier for certain Central American and Eastern 
European nationals to adjust their status to LPR and relaxed the 
standards for discretionary relief from deportation.318 Congress’ 
enactment of NACARA can be seen as neutralizing a negative 
environment for Central American immigrants. By providing increased 
access to LPR status, Central American migrants were given an explicit 
message of welcome. 
The disproportionately low naturalization rates for Mexican 
immigrants have been an issue of interest for immigration scholars 
because they suggest that Mexican immigrants are less incorporated in 
the United States than other immigrants.319 Lower naturalization rates 
mean that a smaller percentage of Mexican immigrants have the full 
bundle of legal rights and social benefits of citizenship. 
Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for the differences in 
naturalization rates. These explanations have focused on the individual 
 
315 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 53, 55; RYTINA, supra note 
13, at 4; NANCY RYTINA, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2009, at 4 (2010); NANCY 
RYTINA, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF 
THE LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2008, at 4 (2009); NANCY RYTINA, 
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL 
PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2007, at 4 (2009); NANCY RYTINA, OFFICE OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL 
PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2006, at 4 (2008); NANCY F. RYTINA, OFFICE OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL 
PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION AND POPULATION ELIGIBLE TO NATURALIZE IN 2004, at 
4 (2006); PASSEL, supra note 24, at 27. 
316 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 53–55. 
317 Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2193 (1997). 
318 Gabrielle M. Buckley, Immigration and Nationality, 32 INT’L LAW. 471, 480 (1998). 
319 See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 81, at 168–70; JACOBSON, supra note 82, at 65. 
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skills and resources of the immigrant, regulatory or bureaucratic barriers 
to naturalization, the relative costs and benefits of naturalizing, and more 
recently, immigrants’ context or environment.320 This section contends 
that immigrants’ context provides valuable information about the 
availability of the social benefits of citizenship. The literature evaluating 
the costs and benefits of naturalizing has focused on the material benefits 
of citizenship. Insufficient attention has been given to the role that the 
social benefits of citizenship play in individual decisions to naturalize. 
The context that immigrants encounter not only explicitly or implicitly 
encourages naturalization; it also provides important information about 
the likelihood of social mobility and being perceived as a member of 
society. A context in which nativity, foreignness, and immigration status 
are closely connected to ethnicity can lead immigrants to conclude that a 
change in citizenship status absent a change in ethnicity will do little to 
increase their perception of belonging or opportunities for social 
mobility. 
The cost–benefit theory of naturalization posits that noncitizens do 
not naturalize because they do not see the benefits of U.S. citizenship 
outweighing the costs. There are two variations of this argument. First, 
citizenship offers few benefits that are not already available to green card 
holders so there is no incentive to naturalize.321 Second, citizenship does 
offer unique benefits, but immigrants are unaware of them. Once 
immigrants become aware of the citizenship benefits, they naturalize.322 
One of the most significant costs of becoming a United States citizen can 
be losing citizenship in one’s home country. Citizenship in many 
countries around the world is required to own property or participate in 
society in other significant ways. If these states do not recognize dual 
citizenship, becoming a United States citizen can mean losing important 
 
320 Bloemraad, Citizenship Lessons from the Past, supra note 8, at 928; see also Jasso & 
Rosenzweig, supra note 82, at 116–21; MICHAEL JONES-CORREA, BETWEEN TWO NATIONS: 
THE POLITICAL PREDICAMENT OF LATINOS IN NEW YORK CITY (1998); SCHUCK, supra note 
81, at 169–70; Robert R. Alvarez, A Profile of the Citizenship Process Among Hispanics in the 
United States, 21 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 327–28 (1987); Bloemraad, supra note 8; Peggy 
Levitt & Nina Glick Schiller, Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field 
Perspective on Society, 38 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 1002, 1024–26 (2004); Louis DeSipio, 
Building America, One Person at a Time: Naturalization and the Political Behavior of the 
Naturalized in Contemporary American Politics, in E PLURIBUS UNUM?: CONTEMPORARY AND 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INCORPORATION 67–106 (Gary 
Gerstle & John Mollenkopf eds., 2001); David S. North, The Long Grey Welcome: A Study 
of the American Naturalization Program, 21 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 311 (1987); Alejandro 
Portes & Rafael Mozo, The Political Adaptation Process of Cubans and Other Ethnic 
Minorities in the United States: A Preliminary Analysis, 19 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 35, 46 
(1985); Carole J. Uhlaner et al., Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s, 
11 POL. BEHAV. 195 (1989); Yang, supra note 88, at 474. 
321 See, e.g., JACOBSON, supra note 82, at 40, 65; SCHUCK, supra note 81, at 168–70; 
YASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL 
MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE 123–24 (1994). 
322 Van Hook et al., supra note 8, at 647. 
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rights in the home country.323 Countries like El Salvador have recognized 
dual citizenship since 1983, but Mexico, the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, and Brazil only began to recognize dual citizenship in the 
mid- to late-1990s.324 Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras have only done so 
since 2004, 2005, and 2003, respectively.325 While this was a significant 
cost historically, today Mexican immigrants and numerous Central 
American and South American immigrants no longer face this cost. 
This section focuses on the second version of the cost–benefit thesis 
because of the significant social and material benefits that are uniquely 
available to citizens. For example, only citizens who are seen as full 
members of society can vote in state and federal elections, can sponsor a 
broader range of relatives for immigrant status, have access to certain 
social welfare benefits, and have an absolutely secure right to enter and 
remain in the United States. Research examining the role of immigrants’ 
environment on naturalization decisions provides new insights into the 
cost–benefit analysis of immigrants’ naturalization decisions. 
B. Context of Reception & Naturalization Decisions 
The social science research on naturalization indicates that both the 
social and material benefits of citizenship are important factors in 
naturalization decisions. So, while access to voting rights, employment 
opportunities, the ability to freely enter the United States, and greater 
ability to sponsor relatives for green cards influence naturalization 
decisions, so does a welcoming environment.326 The disproportionate use 
of traffic stops to ascertain immigration status in Latino communities 
perpetuates the idea that Latinos are foreigners in the United States 
regardless of their birthplace or citizenship status.327 This suggests that 
fewer of the social benefits of naturalization will be available. The court 
decisions permitting the use of ethnicity to establish suspicion of 
unauthorized immigration status without sufficient oversight for abuse 
perpetuates the idea that Latinos are foreigners. 
 
323 See Cristina Escobar, Extraterritorial Political Rights and Dual Citizenship in Latin 
America, 42 LATIN AM. RES. REV., Oct. 2007, at 41, 50–51; Gilbertson & Singer, supra 
note 86, at 30. 
324 Escobar, supra note 323, at 51; Michael Jones-Correa, Under Two Flags: Dual 
Nationality in Latin America and Its Consequences for Naturalization in the United States, 35 
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 997, 999 (2001). 
325 Escobar, supra note 323, at 51. 
326 Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86; Logan et al., supra note 8, at 549; Van 
Hook et al., supra note 8, at 660. 
327 See Chacón, supra note 11; Johnson, supra note 258, at 694–95; Stephen H. 
Legomsky, The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of Noncitizens: National Security and 
International Human Rights, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 178 (2005); Mary Romero 
& Marwah Serag, Violation of Latino Civil Rights Resulting from INS and Local Police’s Use 
of Race, Culture and Class Profiling: The Case of the Chandler Roundup in Arizona, 52 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 75. 
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The burden of proving lawful presence is not felt equally by all 
immigrants, or by immigrants alone. The use of minor traffic offenses as 
a basis for ascertaining immigration status appears to be used 
disproportionately in Latino communities.328 In 2008 the Pew Hispanic 
Center reported that approximately 9% of adult Latinos, citizens and 
immigrants alike, had been stopped by the police or other authorities 
and asked about their immigration status in the past year.329 The rates 
were similar for native-born Latinos and foreign-born Latinos.330 Eight 
percent of native-born Latinos compared to 10% of foreign-born Latinos 
had been stopped for an immigration status inquiry.331 
Citizenship status does not protect Latinos from the burden of 
proving that they are lawfully present in the United States. Four U.S. 
citizens have been detained in Los Angeles County, California pursuant 
to Secure Communities.332 The individuals were arrested for criminal 
offenses and detained additional days pursuant to ICE detainers. For 
example, Antonio Montejano was arrested and charged with petty theft. 
Mr. Montejano was holiday shopping with his four children when his 
youngest daughter begged for a ten dollar bottle of cologne.333 Mr. 
Montejano said he “inadvertently dropped it into a bag of things he had 
already bought. As he left the store, he was arrested.”334 He had no 
criminal record so he expected to post bail quickly. Mr. Montejano had 
his driver’s license and other legal identification, but because of an 
immigration detainer he was denied bail and held after the criminal case 
concluded.335 He was held for two days before he saw a judge on the 
criminal case. At that time he pleaded guilty, the fine was waived, and “he 
was ordered released.”336 Mr. Montejano was held for an additional two 
nights on the immigration detainer. He repeatedly told officers that he 
was an American citizen, but to no avail.337 Once his lawyers sent ICE his 
U.S. passport and birth certificate he was released.338 Mr. Montejano 
concluded that the police did not believe him when he told them he was 
an American citizen because “I look Mexican one hundred percent.”339 
 
328 See, e.g., ACLU COBB, supra note 159; ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159; 
LACAYO, supra note 159; White & Kazerounian, supra note 159. 
329 LOPEZ & MINUSHKIN, supra note 275, at 9. See supra note 275 for 2010 figures. 
330 Id. 
331 Id.  
332 Paloma Esquivel, Immigration Enforcement Snares Citizens, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 
2011, (LATExtra) at 3. 
333 Preston, supra note 277. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. 
336 Esquivel, supra note 332. 
337 Id. 
338 Preston, supra note 277. 
339 Id. ICE issued a detainer for Mr. Montejano because immigration officials had 
failed to recognize his citizenship in the past and incorrectly deported him to Mexico 
in 1996. His records within the DHS database had not been corrected. Id.  
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Romy Campos found herself in a similar situation when she was 
arrested on a minor misdemeanor charge.340 She was denied bail and 
transferred to a Los Angeles County jail pursuant to an ICE detainer.341 
Her public defender told her there was nothing he could do to lift the 
detainer. Ms. Campos did not understand why ICE could not “see in my 
file or something that I’m a citizen.”342 She was released after an 
American Civil Liberties Union lawyer provided ICE with her Florida 
birth certificate.343 The experience left her feeling “misused completely, I 
felt nonimportant, I just felt violated by my own country.”344 
The fact that individuals appear to be Latino is relevant for an 
immigration stop and inquiry. In Brignoni-Ponce the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that “Mexican appearance” is a relevant factor in establishing 
reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence.345 While the Court held that 
“Mexican appearance” alone is insufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion, the Court’s jurisprudence provides very little judicial 
monitoring of immigration enforcement officials.346 Individuals and 
organizations within Latino communities believe that ethnicity is the only 
basis for the pretextual stops and few jurisdictions have allayed these 
concerns.347 
The use of ethnicity, exclusively or primarily, as a basis for 
establishing reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence reinforces the 
idea that those with a Latino appearance are foreign, and likely to be 
unauthorized migrants. This use of ethnicity suggests that citizenship 
provides little protection from the negative attitudes and police 
encounters that Latino immigrants experience as immigrants. The 
concern that citizenship will provide insufficient protection against ICE 
immigration inquiries tracks the notion of second-class citizenship within 
the United States. Legal scholars have long noted that the rights 
 
340 Id. 
341 Id. 
342 Id. 
343 Id. 
344 Id. Ms. Campos is a citizen of the United States and Spain and had a 
Department of Homeland Security record because she once entered the United 
States on her Spanish passport. Id. An additional example comes from Alabama. 
Sixty-six U.S. citizens have been imprisoned in Alabama pursuant to the Beason–
Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2011. Moises Naim, 
Alabama Immigration Law Ensnares People You Wouldn’t Expect, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 17, 
2011), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/17/alabama-immigration-law-
ensnares-people-you-wouldn-t-expect.html. The individuals were imprisoned for not 
having papers with them establishing that they were legal residents of the United 
States. Id. Half of these individuals were black. Id. 
345 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975). 
346 Johnson, supra note 258, at 694–96 (discussing cases). 
347 See, e.g., DAVIDSON CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, supra note 38, at 11, 13; Sheriff 
Conway’s Rebuttal to ACLU on Racial Profiling, GWINNET COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFF., 
http://www.gwinnettcountysheriff.com/index.php/287g/sheriff-conways-rebuttal; see 
also supra text accompanying notes 267–96. 
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associated with citizenship are often experienced differently based on 
factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, social class, and sexual 
orientation.348 Despite the grant of formal citizenship within the United 
States certain groups have “remained excluded and marginalized in 
many significant respects.”349 The second-class citizenship critique 
contends that “the extension of the formal status of citizenship alone can 
mask real oppression and thereby represents a largely empty husk.”350 
Given the history of second-class citizenship in the United States, there is 
little guarantee that formal citizenship status will be an effective shield 
against the negative attitudes and police encounters that some Latino 
immigrants experience. For example, one respondent in the research by 
Professors Massey and Sánchez R. noted “I never would say I am 
American because nobody would believe me.”351 As Latino immigrants’ 
“Mexican appearance” continues to be a legitimate proxy for 
unauthorized immigration status, the legal status of citizenship will 
provide minimal social benefits.352 
C. Alternative Explanations 
1. Naturalization as a Response to a Hostile Context 
Immigrants may respond to a hostile environment in a variety of 
ways. The argument presented in this Article focuses on rejecting 
naturalization because the full range of social benefits may not be 
available. It is also possible that Latino immigrants would respond to such 
hostility by naturalizing in order to play a more prominent role in the 
political process to change the government policies that create or 
contribute to a hostile environment. In the wake of Proposition 187 in 
California,353 Mexican immigrants across the country naturalized at 
increasing numbers. In 1994, 46,186 Mexican immigrants naturalized.354 
That number increased to 79,614 in 1995 and to 217,418 in 1996.355 
Latino immigrants exercised agency by naturalizing as a response to the 
injustices experienced. While this undoubtedly explains why numerous 
Latino immigrants naturalize, it does not help to explain the 
disproportionate naturalization rates. If this was a primary motivator for 
naturalization, Mexican immigrants’ naturalization rate should be on par 
 
348 See, e.g., LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF 
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 87–89 (2006). 
349 Id. at 87. 
350 Id. at 88; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26–62 (1883) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting).  
351 MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ R., supra note 79, at 207. 
352 See supra Part IV.B. 
353 Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Stat. A-317, invalidated by League of United Latin 
Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
354 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1996 STATISTICAL 
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 152 (1997). 
355 Id. 
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with, if not higher than, that of other nationalities. Yet this is not the 
case.356 In 2010, only 10.8% of those who naturalized were Mexican 
immigrants while 32.2% of those eligible to naturalize were Mexican 
immigrants.357 These numbers suggest that a hostile environment is not 
serving as a sufficient motivator for naturalization. Pantoja and Gershon 
actually found that Latinos with a “positive political orientation” or 
positive feelings about the US political system were more likely to 
naturalize than those without such orientation or feelings.358 
2. Does Legal Status Matter? 
Immigrants may perceive their environment as more or less hostile 
depending on their immigration status. To the extent the enforcement 
strategies creating a hostile environment are intended to discourage 
unauthorized migration, those who are lawfully present may not 
experience the enforcement strategies as hostile. For example, a German 
executive with Mercedes-Benz was arrested outside of Tuscaloosa, 
Alabama pursuant to the 2011 immigration law enacted in Alabama.359 
The executive was the subject of a traffic stop and he was only able to 
produce a German identification card. He was arrested for not having 
proper identification pursuant to the state law.360 Only after he was able 
to retrieve his passport, visa, and German driver’s license from his hotel 
was he released from prison.361 Whether this executive experienced his 
arrest and detention as hostile could depend on his pre-existing ideas 
about unauthorized migration and the appropriate strategies for 
addressing it. The fact that he was released after presenting his passport, 
visa, and German driver’s license may have mitigated the negative 
experience. 
Lawfully present migrants may share the opinions and feelings 
underlying the increase in local immigration enforcement. Even if these 
individuals are stopped for minor traffic violations they will generally be 
able to demonstrate lawful presence. Lawfully present migrants may view 
the stops as minor annoyances that are necessary to root out 
 
356 See supra Part V.A. 
357 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 53–55; RYTINA, supra note 
13, at 4. 
358 Adrian D. Pantoja & Sarah Allen Gershon, Political Orientations and Naturalization 
Among Latino and Latina Immigrants, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 1171, 1178–80 (2006). 
359 Naim, supra note 344. 
360 Id. 
361 Id. A similar incident occurred with a Japanese worker at an Alabama Honda 
plant. The Japanese worker appears to have been stopped at a roadblock and ticketed. 
The reason for the ticket is unknown. The worker had his passport and an international 
driver’s license. Jay Reeves, Alabama Immigration Law Leads To Charge For Japanese Honda 
Employee, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/ 
11/30/alabama-immigration-law-honda_n_1121650.html. 
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unauthorized migrants who make it hard for lawfully present migrants.362 
Alternatively if one is an unauthorized migrant, then one is the intended 
target of the enforcement strategies and may view the environment as 
more hostile. While immigration status can impact whether or not 
certain enforcement strategies are experienced as creating a hostile 
environment, the message that certain immigrants are a threat to 
national security, public safety, or the American way of life is received by 
all, authorized immigrants, unauthorized migrants, and citizens alike. 
Research shows that hostility targeted at “illegal immigrants” reaches 
beyond the target and impacts the lives of individuals perceived to be 
unlawfully present.363 The Pew Hispanic Center reports that 36% of 
Latino respondents reported that immigration status is the biggest cause 
of anti-Latino bias.364 Professor Gerald Neuman has noted: 
[T]he discourse of legal status permits coded discussion in which 
listeners will understand that reference is being made, not to aliens 
in the abstract, but to the particular foreign group that is the 
principal focus of current hostility. A background of legal or social 
disapproval of racial, religious or political discrimination creates 
strong incentives for such coding.365 
Public discourse and immigration enforcement strategies often 
conflate being Latino and being an unauthorized migrant.366 Individuals 
who seem Latino, based on skin color, surname, or language, regardless 
of their immigration status, can be on the receiving end of the hostility 
directed toward “illegal immigrants.”367 For example, over 60% of the 
anti-Latino abuses recorded by the Coalition for Humane Immigrant 
Rights of Los Angeles after the passage of Proposition 187 in California 
were directed against citizens or green-card holders.368 
 
362 See, e.g., PEW HISPANIC CENTER, 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY OF LATINOS: AS ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRATION ISSUE HEATS UP, HISPANICS FEEL A CHILL 2–3, 14 (2007), available at 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/84.pdf. 
363 Tanya Broder & Clara Luz Navarro, A Street Without an Exit: Excerpts from the 
Lives of Latinas in Post-187 California, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 275 (1996).  
364 LOPEZ ET AL., supra note 275, at 9. 
365 Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and 
the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1425, 1429 (1995). 
366 Broder and Navarro note that while Proposition 187 in California was 
“[t]outed as an attack only on ‘illegal immigrants,’ the initiative’s effect has extended 
far beyond the intended target, giving license to expressions of hatred against Latinos 
and Asians, including legal residents and United States citizens.” Broder & Navarro, 
supra note 363, at 278.  
367 JIMÉNEZ, supra note 79, at 141 (“In a context of heavy Mexican immigration, 
skin color and sometimes surname become markers of ethnic origin, nativity, and 
even legal status in such a way that Mexican Americans become the direct targets of 
nativism.”). 
368 Broder & Navarro, supra note 363, at 278 n.11 (citing COALITION FOR HUMANE 
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS OF LOS ANGELES (CHIRLA), HATE UNLEASHED: LOS ANGELES IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF 187 16 (1995), reprinted in Nancy Cervantes et al., Hate Unleashed: Los 
Angeles in the Aftermath of Proposition 187, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 20 (1995)). 
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Pedro Ramírez’s experience with Border Patrol demonstrates the 
ways in which efforts targeting unauthorized migrants impact the lives of 
citizens and authorized migrants. Ramírez is a 52-year-old, Mexican-
American educator with a master’s degree.369 He lives in an upper-
middle-class area in Santa Maria, California. One afternoon, after doing 
yard work at a rental property he owned, Ramírez was pulled over by 
Border Patrol. The agent approached Ramírez in Spanish and Ramírez 
responded, “May I help you?”370 To this the agent responded by asking 
Ramírez for identification and if he spoke English. Ramírez provided a 
driver’s license and the agent asked for additional identification. Ramírez 
provided a social security card, at which point the agent asked for 
additional identification. Ramírez responded by pulling out his American 
Express card and said, “Don’t leave home without it.”371 Ramírez felt he 
was being harassed because he was a “Mexican needing a haircut and a 
shave on a Friday afternoon with a bandanna around his neck, with an 
old pickup truck loaded with mowers and edgers and stuff like that.”372 
Ramírez got the Border Patrol agent’s license plate number and badge 
number and sent several letters about the incident. He received several 
responses that essentially said, “Oops, sorry.”373 
Ramírez’s experience is not unique, social scientists have 
documented the use of skin color and surnames to mark Mexican 
Americans as foreign, and often as unauthorized migrants.374 This has led 
some immigrants to conclude that “no matter what they do to regularize 
their status in this country and no matter how many became citizens, 
immigrants and their children will continue to be unwelcome here.”375 
3. Variation Between Context of Reception Components 
While local immigration enforcement strategies may contribute to a 
hostile environment, other components of an immigrant’s environment 
may neutralize the hostility. As noted in Part II, an immigrant’s 
environment has national, regional, state, local, and interpersonal 
components.376 Additionally an immigrant’s environment includes 
educational institutions, public health institutions, employers, social 
welfare institutions, and electoral politics.377 While local immigration 
enforcement strategies may suggest that the full range of social benefits 
of citizenship are not available, other components of one’s environment 
could provide conflicting information. For example, decisions by schools 
or social welfare institutions not to check immigration status may suggest 
 
369 JIMÉNEZ, supra note 79, at 159. 
370 Id. 
371 Id. at 160. 
372 Id. 
373 Id. 
374 See, e.g., id. at 154–60. 
375 Broder & Navarro, supra note 363, at 283.  
376 See supra text accompanying notes 127–28. 
377 MARROW, supra note 18, at 233–36. 
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that Latinos are able to move about society without being presumed to be 
foreign or unlawfully present. Additional research is necessary to better 
understand the interplay between these different components of an 
immigrant’s environment.378 For example, it may be that communities 
utilizing racial profiling and minor traffic offenses as immigration 
enforcement strategies could reduce the negative impact on 
naturalization decisions if schools, social welfare institutions, and other 
community entities provided a more positive environment. 
The previous three sections have provided interesting questions for 
future research to better understand the role of social benefits in 
immigrants’ naturalization decisions. Current research does demonstrate 
that a hostile environment matters. It is my contention that the use of 
racial profiling and minor traffic offenses to identify unauthorized 
migrants creates a hostile environment. As long as government officials 
and the general public view Latino ethnicity as a proxy for unauthorized 
immigration status, citizenship provides Latinos with little protection 
against presumptions of unauthorized immigration status. Those with a 
“Mexican appearance” will still experience pretextual traffic stops. While 
these stops may last longer for noncitizens than for citizens, the initial 
stop will still occur and potentially jeopardize Latinos’ sense of belonging 
within the United States. 
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Brignoni-Ponce reinforces the 
marginal sense of belonging that Latinos can experience. Despite 
acknowledging that the majority of Latinos in the United States are 
citizens or lawful immigrants, the Court concluded that because 
Mexicans accounted for the majority of the unauthorized migrant 
population “Mexican appearance” is relevant.379 A host of factors other 
than ethnic appearance are relevant for determining immigration status. 
The Court identified some in Brignoni-Ponce including “characteristics of 
the area in which [the officers] encounter a vehicle,”380 “the driver’s 
behavior,”381 “[a]spects of the vehicle,”382 and “characteristic appearance 
of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of 
dress and haircut.”383 The difficulty in listing accurate indicators of 
 
378 See id. passim (one of the few studies delineating different dimensions or 
components of context of reception and exploring what they mean for Latino 
immigrants in North Carolina). 
379 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975). 
380 Id. at 884. 
381 Id. at 885. Examples of “the driver’s behavior” include driving erratically or 
obviously attempting to evade officers. Id. 
382 Id. “Aspects of the vehicle” includes factors such as “certain station wagons, 
with large compartments for fold-down seats or spare tires,” a “heavily loaded” 
appearance, a large number of passengers, or if the officers notice individuals trying 
to hide. Id. 
383 Id.; see also Chacón, supra note 11, at 145–46; Chin et al., supra note 257, at 70–
71; Johnson, supra note 30, at 1024. The use of ethnicity is complicated in new 
destination areas in the Southeast where the portion of the Latino population that is 
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unauthorized immigration status is that many factors will similarly 
identify poor migrants.384 For example, those who have jobs that pay cash 
and live in areas and units that are occupied by young men who migrated 
without spouses or children could describe poor lawfully present 
migrants as well as unauthorized migrants. There are provisions for 
individuals with these types of characteristics to be lawfully present in the 
United States. For example, H2-A visas are available for seasonal 
agricultural workers who may fit this description.385 Additionally 
individuals admitted as green-card holders based on a family petition may 
have these characteristics. It may be less likely that these individuals 
would immigrate without their spouses and children, but uncertainty 
about economic prospects may cause families to send one family member 
at a time.386 Using these factors as proxies for unauthorized migrants 
could similarly contribute to a hostile environment and dampen a green-
card holder’s interest in naturalizing. 
D. A Different Way Forward 
A more effective strategy for identifying unauthorized migrants that 
has less potential for discouraging naturalization is workplace 
enforcement. By identifying individuals who are working without valid 
social security numbers the government can more accurately target 
individuals who are in fact unauthorized migrants. Rather than 
deputizing local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration law, 
the federal government could deputize state officials to conduct 
workplace audits. The increased use of E-Verify is a step in this direction. 
E-Verify is an internet-based system for determining employee eligibility 
to work in the United States. The system accesses Social Security 
Administration and Department of Homeland Security records to 
 
unauthorized is higher than it is nationally or in older destination locations. See supra 
text accompanying notes 25–29. 
384 In United States v. Magana, Border Patrol officers explained that they had 
reasonable suspicion to stop Magana’s truck because “[t]he six passengers appeared 
to be farm workers, one of whom wore a hat which the officers emphasized was 
indicative of someone who came from the Mexican state of Jalisco. They stated that 
such hats, while often worn by illegal aliens, were seldom worn by anyone who had 
lived in the United States for very long because it would bring them to the attention 
of the INS.” 797 F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1986). In Farm Labor Organizing Committee v. 
Ohio State Highway Patrol, an Ohio State Highway Patrol officer testified that “he 
became suspicious that a motorist was an illegal alien if the motorist was going to pick 
crops, was coming from Florida or Texas, had little money, was driving an older 
vehicle, and/or was wearing old clothes.” 95 F. Supp. 2d 723, 736 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
See Johnson, supra note 258, at 699–700 (noting that in practice the Border Patrol’s 
profile for unauthorized migrants is based on class and race factors). 
385 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2006). 
386 It is not uncommon for the husband in a family to immigrate first and once 
established send for his wife and children. PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, 
supra note 61, at 357. 
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determine employment eligibility.387 Numerous states are requiring 
certain categories of employers or all employers to utilize this program.388 
E-Verify and workplace enforcement more generally are not without 
their problems.389 For example, the accuracy of the system has been 
called into question. In 2007, DHS commissioned an independent 
evaluation of E-Verify. The evaluators concluded that the accuracy rates 
did not meet the requirements established in the 1986 immigration 
reforms introducing employer liability.390 The Office of Inspector General 
estimated that approximately 7%of the Social Security records for 
noncitizens were incorrect.391 These individuals were actually U.S. citizens 
whose files mischaracterized them as noncitizens.392 E-Verify provides a 
tentative confirmation of eligibility to work or a tentative non-
confirmation of authority to work. Tentative non-confirmations are the 
result of an employee not being authorized to work, out of date records 
at the Social Security Administration, or an input error by the 
employer.393 Foreign-born workers are 30 times more likely to receive an 
incorrect tentative non-confirmation than native-born workers, and 10% 
of authorized foreign-workers receive tentative non-confirmations.394 
These errors can limit the employment opportunities of individuals. 
Another challenge with workplace enforcement is which employers will 
be targeted for government audits. If only employers who employ large 
numbers of Latino migrants are the subject of government audits, similar 
concerns regarding racial profiling could develop. Workplace 
enforcement, however, can provide a more tailored approach to 
identifying unauthorized migrants. It can limit the conflation of Latino 
 
387 E-Verify FAQ, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13127. 
388 Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia all require public employers to utilize E-Verify. See id. 
As of November 2011 Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah also require certain private employers 
to use E-Verify as well. Id. 
389 See Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
1103 (2009). 
390 WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE WEB BASIC PILOT EVALUATION 56 (2007), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/WebBasicPilotRprtSept2007.pdf. 
391 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE REPORT: ACCURACY OF THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S NUMIDENT FILE ii (2006), available at 
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-08-06-26100.pdf. 
392 Id. 
393 Naomi Barrowclough, Note, E-Verify: Long-Awaited ‘Magic Bullet’ or Weak Attempt 
to Substitute Technology for Comprehensive Reform?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 791, 812 n.160 
(2010) (citing Electronic Employment Verification Systems: Needed Safeguards to Protect 
Privacy and Prevent Misuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, 
Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 49 (2008) 
(statement of Johnathan “Jock” Scharfen)). 
394 Id. at 812. 
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ethnicity with unauthorized immigration status.395 It is this conflation that 
undermines the social benefits that Latino immigrants can expect to 
obtain by becoming citizens. 
CONCLUSION 
Immigration enforcement is undoubtedly an important goal, but so 
is the incorporation of immigrants. The growth of “self-deportation” 
policies undermines Latino immigrant incorporation. The use of racial 
profiling and minor traffic violations in immigration enforcement is 
contributing to a hostile environment for Mexican immigrants, which 
reduces the likelihood that eligible Mexican immigrants will naturalize. 
The disproportionate use of pretextual traffic stops in Latino 
communities perpetuates the idea that those with a Latino appearance 
are foreign and likely unauthorized. The connection made between 
Latino appearance, foreign birth, and immigration status suggests that a 
change in citizenship status absent a change in ethnicity will do little to 
facilitate the social and economic mobility expected to come with 
citizenship. 
Social science research has demonstrated that decisions to naturalize 
are shaped not only by the material benefits of citizenship, but also by the 
social benefits of citizenship. Immigrants obtain valuable information 
about whether immigrants are welcome, whether the host society values 
immigrant contributions, and whether acceptance and mobility will be 
possible from the structural and cultural aspects of their environment. 
Immigrants are more likely to naturalize when they believe that they will 
be able to take advantage of the full range of citizenship benefits. Further 
research is needed to determine how immigrants value the material 
benefits of citizenship compared to the social benefits. Are there contexts 
in which one set of benefits outweighs another? Are certain types of 
material and social benefits more important than others? Empirical 
research on these and related questions will assist in developing 
immigration policy that better balances our society’s desire for enforcing 
federal immigration law and facilitating immigrant incorporation. 
Efforts to enforce federal immigration law and identify unauthorized 
migrants are felt by citizens, authorized migrants, and unauthorized 
migrants when ethnicity is used as the primary, or a significant, factor. 
The use of this strategy may enable ICE to identify a greater number of 
unauthorized migrants, but it will come at the cost of alienating potential 
 
395 Identifying serious criminals, those in Secure Communities Level one and two 
categories, is a legitimate enforcement priority and local law enforcement officers 
could play a role in identifying these individuals. This could be accomplished by 
revising 287(g) jail agreements to only apply to individuals charged with Level one 
and two crimes or to focus on individuals who are incarcerated after a conviction for 
a Level one or two crime. These alternatives would allow for a more robust system for 
identifying serious criminals who are noncitizens and remove the incentive for 
officers to use minor traffic offenses as a pretext for ascertaining immigration status. 
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citizens and limiting the incorporation of Latino immigrants in the 
United States. 
